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AGAINST CONGRESSIONAL CASE SNATCHING
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.* & ATTICUS DEPROSPO**
ABSTRACT
Congress has developed a deeply problematic habit of aggrandiz-
ing itself by snatching cases from the Article III courts. One form of
contemporary case snatching involves directly legislating the outcome
of pending litigation by statute. These laws do not involve generic
amendments to existing statutes but rather dictate specific rulings
by the Article III courts in particular cases. Another form of congres-
sional case snatching involves rendering ongoing judicial proceed-
ings essentially advisory by unilaterally permitting a disgruntled
litigant to transfer a pending case from an Article III court to an
executive agency for resolution. Both practices involve Congress
reallocating the business of the Article III courts, and both should be
deemed to violate the separation of powers doctrine. Unfortunately,
however, the Supreme Court’s institutional response to this troubling
new trend of congressional reassignment of core judicial business has
been (at best) halting, tepid, and weak. In a trio of recent decisions,
the Justices have given Congress a green light to direct merits results
in pending litigation before the Article III courts (Patchak v. Zinke
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and Bank Markazi v. Peterson) and also blessed giving disgruntled
litigants the unfettered right to remove pending judicial business
from an Article III court to an Article II agency (Oil States Energy
Services v. Greene’s Energy Group).
These three decisions reflect a regrettable return to functionalist
analysis in separation of powers disputes involving threats to the
structural integrity and independence of the Article III courts.
Simply put, vesting the “judicial power” in the federal courts means
that judges, not members of Congress, must decide how to interpret
and apply the law. This is, after all, the central holding of Marbury
v. Madison. Under well-settled separation of powers principles,
Congress should not be permitted to aggrandize itself by usurping the
decisional authority of the Article III courts. Nor should Congress be
empowered to render ongoing federal court proceedings entirely
advisory by vesting a litigant who fears an adverse decision with the
unilateral power to force a remand of a pending lawsuit to a
potentially more sympathetic federal administrative agency.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist Papers, presciently
observed that the judiciary constitutes the least dangerous branch of
the federal government. If this is so, it also means that the judiciary
is the weakest of the three branches. Separation of powers doctrine
and practice must take account of this important structural reality.
Vindicating the Madisonian system of checks and balances requires
that congressional case snatching, in all of its forms and manifesta-
tions, must be categorically resisted and rejected.
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INTRODUCTION
Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist Papers, famously observed
that the federal courts constitute “the least dangerous” branch of
the federal government because they have “no influence over either
the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the
wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.”1
He added that the judiciary “may truly be said to have neither
FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.”2 By way of contrast, the President “dispenses the
honors” and also “holds the sword of the community,” and Congress
“not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the
duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.”3
If we take seriously Hamilton’s observations about the relative
institutional strength of the three branches of the federal govern-
ment, what implications should they have for theorizing and
applying the separation of powers doctrine to novel schemes that
attempt either to strip cases from the Article III courts or to
constrain, if not control, their disposition?
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a
government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its
functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution;
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”).
2. Id.
3. Id. For a general discussion of the institutional and structural limits of the federal
courts, with particular attention to the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” see ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23
(1962). John Hart Ely has also addressed the problem of the relative weakness of the federal
courts vis-á-vis Congress and the President. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 101-03 (1980). Ely posits that the federal courts should
attempt to conserve their institutional capital and use it to advance a general project of
reinforcing the process of democratic self-government. See id. at 101-02, 178-81. He argues
“that unlike an approach geared to the judicial imposition of ‘fundamental values,’ the
representation-reinforcing orientation ... is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary is
entirely supportive of, the American system of representative democracy.” Id. at 101-02. In
Ely’s view, having federal judges address structural failures in the democratic process, such
as malapportioned electoral districts, “assigns judges a role they are conspicuously well-
situated to fill.” Id. at 102-03.
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This Article argues that in order to forestall bad endings, the
federal courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular,
should more zealously guard their institutional authority by more
strictly enforcing the separation of powers doctrine when Congress
attempts to usurp or transfer away pieces of the judicial power of
the United States from the Article III courts (including even
relatively small ones). It proceeds in three Parts.
Part I considers the relevance of Hamilton’s least dangerous
branch thesis to congressional attempts to dictate how federal
courts should rule in pending cases or to reassign pending judicial
business entirely outside the Article III courts (phenomena that we
denominate “congressional case snatching”). This Part argues that
Hamilton’s well-stated concerns about the inherent weakness of the
least dangerous branch require the federal courts to resolutely turn
back any and all efforts by Congress or the President to usurp or
reassign the judicial power of Article III courts. Moreover, this Part
highlights the waxing and waning of formalism in separation of
powers analysis in the contemporary Supreme Court. What’s more,
it provides an overview of the formalism/functionalism dichotomy.
Part II traces the meandering path that the Supreme Court has
charted, zigging and zagging between strict formalist enforcement
of the separation of powers in the context of congressional case
snatching (Stern v. Marshall and Executive Benefits Insurance
Agency v. Arkinson) and more relaxed functionalist analysis
(Patchak v. Zinke, Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy
Group, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor). In
this Part, we show how a strong and stable majority of the contem-
porary Supreme Court has come to embrace a distinctly functional-
ist approach that precludes the invalidation of congressional efforts
to reassign judicial business from the Article III courts. We believe
that the Supreme Court has overstated the benefits of these
congressional incursions into the constitutional territory of the
Article III courts and, concurrently, seriously underestimated the
potential risks that congressional case snatching schemes present.
Part III explains why this functionalist turn constitutes a mis-
take (and a big one) and should be rejected in favor of a more for-
malist approach. Drawing on the Hamiltonian least dangerous
branch thesis, we argue that the inherent structural weakness of
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the federal courts requires judicial vigilance against congressional
case snatching. Finally, we offer a brief overview and conclusion of
our main themes, arguments, and proofs.
Iconic federal courts scholar James Pfander has observed woefully
that “[s]cholars have searched, with mixed success, for an organiz-
ing and limiting principle in the somewhat muddled jurisprudence
... govern[ing]” the reassignment of adjudicative responsibilities
from the Article III courts.4 What is true of legal scholars would also
seem to hold true of the federal courts.5 Yet, this lack of agreement
on the rules of the road does not seriously undermine, much less
refute, the structural concerns that arise quite organically from
Hamilton’s least dangerous branch thesis. Simply put, the least
dangerous branch is also the most vulnerable branch. The federal
courts should take greater care to incorporate this fact of constitu-
tional life into separation of powers doctrine.
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN HAMILTON’S TIME AND OURS:
THE CONTINUING SALIENCE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
DOCTRINE
“Basic to the constitutional structure established by the Framers
was their recognition that ‘[t]he accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.’”6
As a result, the Framers devised a national government that
reflected Montesquieu’s conception of the separation of powers;7 the
federal government would comprise three distinct branches, with
each branch to exercise inherently distinct governmental powers
4.  James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of
the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 647 (2004). Pfander also observes that “[s]cholars
have expressed little enthusiasm for either the Court’s categorical approach or its balancing
approach.” Id. at 665.
5. Compare infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s
functionalist approach in a trio of recent cases), with infra note 70 and accompanying text
(outlining the Chief Justice’s formalist dissents).
6. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 300 (James Madison) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)).
7. See CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT, 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF M. DE MONTESQUIEU
198-200 (London, T. Evans (Strand) & W. Davis (Piccadilly), 1777).
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and to do so largely independently of the other two branches.
Notably, our Constitution ensures that the judicial power of the
United States “must be reposed in an independent Judiciary.”8
Thus, the “independence of the Judiciary [must] be jealously
guarded.”9
Part I reviews the implications of Alexander Hamilton’s least
dangerous branch thesis. It posits that, if one credits this idea
seriously, it necessarily follows that the federal courts must
zealously oppose and systematically fend off attempted raids by
Congress or the President to commandeer the constitutional
authority of the Article III courts (namely, the “judicial Power” of
the United States). In addition, Part I discusses how the Supreme
Court has systematically failed to aggressively, or even reliably,
enforce the separation of powers doctrine in instances in which the
institutional rights and prerogatives of the federal courts are
squarely at issue. More specifically, Part I provides several salient
examples of recent minor attacks on the authority of the Article III
courts that could lead to more, and perhaps even more ambitious,
instances of congressional case snatching. Lastly, this Part provides
an overview of the waxing and waning of formalism in separation of
powers analysis in the contemporary Supreme Court.
8. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 60.
9. Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The
reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his
meaning. ‘When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body,’
says he, ‘there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or
senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.’ Again: ‘Were the
power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the
executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.’ Some of these
reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they
sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this
celebrated author.”). James Madison describes Montesquieu as “the oracle” of the separation
of powers. See id. at 301. (“The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the
celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of
politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the
attention of mankind.”).
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A. The Least Dangerous Branch Thesis and the Growing
Problem of Congressional Encroachments on the 
Constitutional Authority of the Article III Courts
In advancing his least dangerous branch thesis, Hamilton’s core
claim—namely that the judicial branch is particularly weak and
highly vulnerable to incursions from the political branches—would
provide a strong theoretical and empirical basis for the federal
courts to strictly enforce the separation of powers in instances that
involve invasions of the constitutional authority of the federal
courts.10 Because, as Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., has explained,
“[t]he Federal Judiciary was ... designed by the Framers to stand
independent of the Executive and Legislature—to maintain the
checks and balances of the constitutional structure, and also to
guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained impar-
tial,”11 the Hamiltonian inherent structural weakness thesis could
easily justify a more cautious approach towards efforts to tinker
with the constitutional authority of the Article III courts.12 From
this vantage point, as Justice Brennan argues, “Art[icle] III both
defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial
Branch.”13
Under this approach, the federal courts should resolutely turn
back any and all efforts by Congress or the President either to usurp
or to reassign “[t]he judicial Power of the United States.”14 The
inherent structural weakness of the federal courts, relative to the
political branches, requires judicial vigilance rather than compla-
cence and accommodation.15 Because Congress and the President
have more and better tools to fend off attempted raids on each
other’s constitutional turf, the federal courts could adopt a more
10. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 58-60 (plurality opinion).
11. Id. at 58.
12. See id. at 58-60.
13. Id. at 58.
14. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2 (vesting the judicial power in the federal courts and
defining the scope of “[t]he judicial Power of the United States”).
15. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion) (opining that “our
Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle—that the ‘judicial Power of
the United States’ must be reposed in an independent Judiciary” and interpreting this
constitutional text as a “command[ ] that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously
guarded”).
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laissez-faire, or functionalist, approach to defining and enforcing the
separation of powers in cases involving novel governmental
structures or relationships involving these branches without doing
undue damage to the Madisonian system of checks and balances.16
The Madisonian system of carefully calibrated and separated
powers, in which ambition will check ambition,17 requires a federal
judiciary up to the task of enforcing constitutional strictures when
Congress or the President seek to disregard them.18 Despite the
critical importance of the federal judiciary in enforcing constitu-
tional limitations, many contemporary public law scholars argue
that the Madisonian system of separated powers is either failing or
already has failed.19 As Professor Sanford Levinson has lamented,
“James Madison has truly, and irrevocably, left the building.”20 If
this is so, and many very thoughtful and talented legal scholars
16. But cf. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 445-47 (1998) (invalidating the Line
Item Veto Act because it gave “the President the unilateral power to change the text of duly
enacted statutes”); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730-32 (1986) (invalidating the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act on formalist grounds because the majority could
“see no escape from the conclusion that, because Congress has retained removal authority
over the Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with executive powers”); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 958-59 (1983) (invalidating the use of legislative veto provisions
despite them constituting “a convenient shortcut” and explaining that “[t]here is no support
in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness
and delays often encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may be
avoided”).
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”). Madison also argues that those serving
in each branch of the federal government must have principal loyalties to their own
institution in order for the system of checks and balances to function properly and reliably.
See id. (“The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.
It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the
abuses of government.”).
18. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 58-60 (plurality opinion).
19. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice,
and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1112 (2013) (“Congress by itself often seems
either unable or unwilling to provide adequate checks on executive power.”); Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 884 (2007) (arguing that
“[w]hether or not this picture [of Madison’s ambition checking ambition] was ever realistic,
it is no longer so today”). For an excellent discussion and critique of the problems vexing our
national governing institutions these days, see generally SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M.
BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION (2019).
20. LEVINSON & BALKIN, supra note 19, at 50.
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clearly believe it to be so,21 then the need for the judiciary to hold its
constitutional ground is more important than ever.22
The argument for more rigorous enforcement of the separation of
powers to protect the Article III courts also has some textual basis
in the Constitution itself.23 After all, Article III requires “[t]he
judicial Power of the United States” to be vested exclusively in the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts.24 On the other hand,
however, the Constitution also features identical Vesting Clauses
that place all legislative powers in the hands of Congress25 and all
21. See BRUCE ACKERMAN,THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 2-12 (2010)
(arguing that the traditional Madisonian system of separate, distinct executive, legislative,
and judicial powers has been eroding, at an accelerating pace over time, in favor of an all-
powerful “runaway presidency”); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 14-15 (2010) (arguing “that executive-centered
government in the administrative state is inevitable” and that courts applying the separation
of powers doctrine “cannot hope to constrain the modern executive”). Professor Ackerman
warns specifically about the dangers of undue judicial deference to the Executive Branch. See
ACKERMAN, supra, at 142.
22. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 58 (plurality opinion).
23. See id. at 58-60.
24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”). Some public law scholars, for example Dean John Manning, argue that
general separation of powers principles should be left to the political branches to police. See
John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939,
1944-48, 2005, 2021-22, 2040 (2011). Manning specifically questions whether more general
provisions of the Constitution that allocate powers, such as the Vesting Clauses of Articles
I, II, and III, should be judicially enforced to invalidate novel administrative structures. See
id. at 2014-21. Manning argues that formalist separation of powers analysis, which does
involve judicially enforced limits flowing from the Vesting Clauses, “risk[s] attributing
excessive determinacy to the Vesting Clauses in certain types of cases.” Id. at 2021. He posits
that “[b]y invalidating schemes on the ground that they offend a freestanding norm of strict
separation, formalists undervalue the indeterminacy of the Vesting Clauses relative to
Congress’s authority to shape government under the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Id. at
1945. This may well be so. However, the indeterminacy argument does not really address
Hamilton’s core concerns about the relative weakness of the federal judiciary vis-á-vis the
political branches. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 465-66. This intrinsic
structural weakness could provide a basis for greater judicial willingness to imply structural
limits from Article III’s Vesting Clause—and thereby to distinguish it from the Vesting
Clauses of Articles I and II, because good reasons exist to believe that the federal courts are
not constitutionally well-positioned to defend their institutional turf. See LEVINSON &BALKIN,
supra note 19, at 153-55, 158-59, 170-73 (describing the failures of the separation of powers
doctrine).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”).
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executive powers with the President.26 Should these clauses have
the same structural implications for defining and applying the
separation of powers doctrine?27 At least arguably, they should not.
The role of the federal courts as a de facto referee of last resort be-
tween Congress and the President28 should require that they as-
siduously fend off attempted raids on the judiciary’s constitutional
authority (whether by Congress or the President). One could deem
such raids quite literally to constitute “roughing up the referee,”
something never permitted in competitive sports featuring referees
or umpires.29
To be sure, some legal academics, such as Dean John Manning,
are skeptical about formalist enforcement of the Vesting Clauses.30
Indeed, Manning expresses serious doubts about the relevance of
any of the Vesting Clauses to interpreting and applying the
separation of powers doctrine.31 Yet, he also cautions that “[b]ecause
the structural provisions come in many shapes and sizes, no one-
size-fits-all theory can do them justice.”32
26. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”).
27. See Manning, supra note 24, at 1945 (“Most prominently, the Vesting Clauses speak
in general terms about the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and say nothing about
how these clauses intersect with Congress’s broad coordinate power to compose the
government under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”). Dean Manning argues that “[l]ike
most bargained-for texts, the Constitution’s structural provisions thus leave many important
questions unaddressed.” Id.
28. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing
that “[t]he Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between
the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse” but
implying that when such an impasse has been reached, the federal courts have a duty to
decide the merits).
29. See ALAN S. GOLDBERGER, SPORTS OFFICIATING: A LEGAL GUIDE 213-24 (2d ed. 2007)
(discussing the phenomenon of players, parents, and fans assaulting referees and umpires and
legal remedies available to officiating officials). See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The
New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 995 (2000) (“Each sport, whether football or figure skating, requires
rules and judges to enforce those rules.”).
30. See Manning, supra note 24, at 1944-48, 2017-23.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1945. Like Manning, Professors Posner and Vermeule are highly skeptical about
the ability of the judiciary to comprehensively police the boundaries that separate legislative,
executive, and judicial powers. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 13-17 (arguing
that the Madisonian system of carefully calibrated and separated powers has atrophied in the
face of ever-broader unilateral presidential authority and suggesting that in the contemporary
United States “law does little to constrain the modern executive” but that “politics and public
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If one takes seriously this admonition about “one size” not fitting
all cases, it would seem to support judicial efforts aimed at differen-
tiating how the federal courts interpret and enforce the Vesting
Clauses of Articles I, II, and III in the context of applying the
separation of powers doctrine. Precisely because the three branches
of the federal government are differently structured, the structural
implications of the Vesting Clauses can and should differ too.
Accordingly, even if as a general matter good arguments exist for
permitting Congress and the President to adopt novel power-sharing
arrangements that permit Congress to play a role in executing the
laws33 or the President to have a role in shaping them,34 the
inherent structural weakness of the Article III courts would justify
more vigilant enforcement of generalized separation of powers
concerns to disallow structural innovations involving the federal
courts.
Of course, one of Hamilton’s main objectives in Federalist No. 78
was to reassure the body politic that the federal courts would not
constitute a serious threat to the rights and liberties of the people.35
opinion do constrain the modern executive”).
33. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-68 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“The
prominence of the legislative veto mechanism in our contemporary political system and its
importance to Congress can hardly be overstated. It has become a central means by which
Congress secures the accountability of executive and independent agencies.”). Justice Byron
White, defending the so-called legislative veto against a separation of powers objection,
observed that
[w]ithout the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson’s choice: either
to refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless
task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special
circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to
abdicate its law-making function to the Executive Branch and independent
agencies.
Id. at 968.
34. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991) (observing that “[t]he
Constitution provides that ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States’” and explaining that “[f]rom this language the Court has
derived the nondelegation doctrine: that Congress may not constitutionally delegate its
legislative power to another branch of Government” but that “the nondelegation doctrine does
not prevent Congress from seeking assistance, within proper limits, from its coordinate
Branches”). But cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (“The idea that
an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to
exercise some of that power seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of which
portion of the power to exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress
had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.”).
35. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 465-66 (observing “that the judiciary is
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The other, without doubt, was to make clear that the federal courts
would enjoy the power of judicial review, a power that he deemed
indispensable to ensuring the efficacy of a written, or “limited,”
constitution.36 Well before Chief Justice John Marshall’s iconic
opinion in Marbury v. Madison,37 Hamilton had made clear beyond
peradventure that the federal courts would enjoy a power of judicial
review over federal and state laws.38
In this sense, then, Hamilton’s argument presumes that the
institutional weakness of the federal courts, relative to Congress
and the President, would constitute a virtue rather than a design
defect.39 But is Hamilton’s assumption correct? After all, a set of
juridical entities either unable or unwilling to protect their constitu-
tional authority probably will not be able to enforce a valid judicial
order against an unwilling or intransigent President or Congress.40
beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power” and “that it can never
attack with success either of the other two”). Indeed, Hamilton cautions “that all possible care
is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.” Id. at 466.
36. Id. (“The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a
limited Constitution.”). But cf. Manning, supra note 24, at 1980-82 (arguing that life tenure
and salary protections afford sufficient institutional protection for the federal courts to obviate
the need for strict enforcement of Article III’s Vesting Clause).
37. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a detailed and thoughtful overview of Marbury, see
generally William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J.
1.
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 468 (explaining “that where the will of the
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former”). What is
more, “the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and
subordinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the
Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard
the former.” Id. Given the emphatic endorsement of judicial review by one of the principal
proponents of ratification of the Constitution, the question could reasonably be deemed an
open and shut one. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 (7 Pet.) U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (“The
question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much difficulty.”).
39. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 468.
40. For example, the Trump administration’s Department of Justice, under the leadership
of Attorney General William Barr, ordered immigration judges to ignore a panel decision of
the Seventh Circuit. Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1033, 1035-36 (7th Cir. 2020) (observing
that, following issuance of the court’s mandate, “[w]hat happened next beggars belief,”
discussing the Department of Justice’s open defiance of the Seventh Circuit’s order in the
case, and warning that “[w]e have never before encountered defiance of a remand order, and
we hope never to see it again”); see also Kimberly Wehle, A Conservative Judge Draws a Line
in the Sand with the Trump Administration, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2020, 11:40 AM), https://
perma.cc/QC6G-RDJC (“In defying the 7th Circuit, therefore, Attorney General Barr chal-
lenged the validity of Marbury v. Madison itself—and thus the federal judiciary’s authority
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And if enforcing the strictures of a “limited Constitution” is es-
sential in order for them to be meaningful, then too much institu-
tional weakness definitely constitutes a design defect (and a rather
serious one).41
Hamilton was quite correct to posit that the federal courts are,
relative to the political branches, institutionally weak and thus
poorly situated to defend their institutional interests and author-
ity.42 And, precisely because of this structural reality, it becomes
even more important for the federal judiciary to defend its insti-
tutional powers and prerogatives against efforts by either Congress
or the President to snatch them away.43 If Congress may usurp or
redirect judicial authority, the cumulative effect of such encroach-
ments on the Article III courts could render them incapable of
playing their crucial checking function on the political branches.44
Implicit in Dean John Manning’s argument is the existence of a
federal judiciary up to the task of enforcing specific constitutional
strictures.45 Permitting the political branches to aggrandize them-
selves by usurping judicial authority or to encroach on the judiciary
by rendering it more difficult, perhaps even impossible, for the
federal courts to exercise “[t]he judicial Power of the United
States”46 risks rendering completely nugatory the Constitution’s
to say what the law is and have it stick.”). Despite Judge Frank Easterbrook’s umbrage, what
precisely could a federal court do if the Attorney General ordered a detained person deported
in the face of a federal court order that prohibits this action? Viable options for judicial self-
help would appear to be very limited and of doubtful efficacy.
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 466.
42. See id. at 465-66.
43. See F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71
VAND. L. REV. 715, 718-19 (2018) (arguing that “Article III assigns the judicial power to the
federal courts, and nothing in the Constitution allows the parties to reallocate that power”
and defending strong rules against encroachments on the authority of the Article III courts
because doing so will protect and advance “society’s broader interests in living under a
government that adjudicates based on the rule of law instead of political considerations,
maintaining a system of adjudication that provides adequate remedies for violations of rights,
and preventing imprudent government actions by requiring various government institutions
with different interests to evaluate those actions”).
44. See Manning, supra note 24, at 2004.
45. See id. at 2005-17.
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Although Congress enjoys broad constitutional authority to
create—or not create—lower federal courts and to fix their jurisdiction as it wishes, as well
as to tinker with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States, see id.
art. III, § 2, Congress does not have discretion to vest the federal judicial power entirely
outside the Article III courts. The language of Article III, section 1 is mandatory, not
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specific rules on how Congress and the Executive Branch should
exercise their respective governing authority.47 In this respect,
Manning’s support for judicial enforcement of specific textual limits
on the structure and function of the three branches presupposes a
federal judiciary able and willing to make its judgments stick.48
Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court has generally been
less aggressive in strictly enforcing the separation of powers
doctrine in instances when the institutional rights and prerogatives
of the federal courts are squarely at issue.49 In a number of land-
mark separation of powers cases, such as Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Schor, the Supreme Court has deployed an
open-ended balancing test that takes into consideration
the extent to which the “essential attributes of judicial power”
are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to
which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdic-
tion and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the
origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the
discretionary; “[t]he judicial Power of the United States shall be vested” with either the lower
federal courts or the Supreme Court. Id. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
47. Cf. Manning, supra note 24, at 1945-48 (arguing that the federal courts should not
attempt to impose organizational limits based on general clauses, such as the Vesting
Clauses, but should respect the “specificity” of other constitutional provisions that create
particular rules limiting how Congress or the President must exercise their constitutional
powers). Dean Manning explains that “[w]here the Constitution is specific, the Court should
read it the way it reads all specific texts” and enforce such limits strictly. Id. at 1947. On the
other hand, however, “[i]f legislation regulating the powers of the coordinate branches neither
contradicts an identifiable background understanding of one of the Vesting Clauses nor
effectively reallocates power from its specified branch, interpreters should not invalidate such
legislation by reading abstract notions of the separation of powers into those otherwise open-
ended clauses.” Id. at 1948.
48. See id. at 2040 (positing that “interpreters should determine the allocation of power
by asking how it is effectuated by particular clauses” and that “[w]hen the Constitution
conditions the exercise of power on compliance with a specified procedure, interpreters should
enforce that specific framework strictly”). Presumably the “interpreters” that Manning has
in mind to secure “compliance” with specific constitutional strictures are judges serving on the
Article III courts. See id.
49. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)
(observing that the Supreme Court “has declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules”
in cases raising separation of powers questions involving the Article III courts in favor of
“weigh[ing] a number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with an eye
to the practical effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned
role of the federal judiciary”).
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concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements
of Article III.50
In 2011, however, in Stern v. Marshall, the Roberts Court seemed
to signal that it would embrace a more formalist approach and
critically review efforts by Congress to transfer matters at the core
of the judicial power of the United States to non-Article III tribu-
nals.51
Writing for the Stern majority, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
sounded a decidedly different note from Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Schor.52 Rather than considering the
efficiencies that might be associated with permitting bankruptcy
courts to adjudicate common law counterclaims (despite an unwill-
ing litigant) and then balancing the benefits against the degree of
encroachment that the scheme involved, the Chief Justice declared
in categorical terms that the judicial power of the United States
may not be transferred outside the Article III courts.53 He explained
that “Article III could neither serve its purpose in the system of
checks and balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial decision-
making if the other branches of the Federal Government could
confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities outside Article
III.”54
Given this strong language, endorsed by a clean majority of the
Supreme Court, one might reasonably have believed that Stern
constituted a kind of judicial turning point. In other words, it
50. Id.; see Pfander, supra note 4, at 646-47 (observing, quite correctly, that the Supreme
Court “has seemingly retreated to a multifactored balancing test that includes judicial
independence as one factor and often results in the validation of Article I tribunals”).
51. 564 U.S. 462, 487 (2011) (analyzing whether bankruptcy courts, which are non-Article
III tribunals, have authority to hear certain common law counterclaims and deciding they do
not); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the
Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential
Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1619
(2012) (“The [Stern] majority’s analysis was unabashedly formalist in tone and approach.”);
see id. at 1605 (“The Roberts Court’s separation-of-powers decisions reflect a pronounced trend
toward formalism.”); id. at 1621 (“If one reads Stern in tandem with Free Enterprise Fund, it
becomes reasonably clear that a majority of the Roberts Court has embraced formalism and
has done so with gusto.”).
52. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851-52.
53. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 483-85.
54. Id. at 484.
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seemed likely that the Roberts Court’s “strong, pronounced ... turn
toward formalism”55 would have some staying power. On its face,
the Stern majority opinion reflects a renewed and vigorous judicial
commitment to fending off congressional efforts to transfer its
constitutional duties to non-Article III fora (whether those fora are
executive branch agencies or so-called “Article I tribunals” that are
not staffed by presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed, life-
tenured judges).56 But, for better or worse, this is not how these
matters have come to rest.
To be sure, the Supreme Court initially stood by its guns and
imposed a saving construction on the Bankruptcy Act that made
facts found by bankruptcy court judges (related to common law
claims) merely advisory—with the district courts fully empowered
to adopt, revise, or wholly reject them.57 Writing for a unanimous
bench in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkinson, Justice
Clarence Thomas explained “that when, under Stern’s reasoning,
the Constitution does not permit a bankruptcy court to enter final
judgment on a bankruptcy-related claim, the relevant statute
nevertheless permits a bankruptcy court to issue proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law to be reviewed de novo by the district
court.”58 But the center did not hold; in the Court’s most recent
decisions, the Justices have returned to a more functionalist
analysis of congressional attempts to reassign the business of the
federal courts to non-Article III tribunals.59
55. Krotoszynski, supra note 51, at 1602.
56. For a detailed and quite thoughtful discussion of the constitutionally complex
relationship between Article I tribunals and Article III courts, see generally Pfander, supra
note 4. In discussing the scholarly effort to find a “limiting principle” for this relationship,
Professor Pfander posits that the Supreme Court must remain atop a hierarchy of “inferior”
federal and state courts and suggests that considerations rooted in “unity, supremacy, and
inferiority provide a textual predicate for a variety of structural features of the Article III
judicial department.” Id. at 648-49. Under this approach, “the Constitution does not permit
Congress to place such inferior federal courts beyond the supervision and control of the
Supreme Court—their judicial superior.” Id. at 650.
57. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 38 (2014) (holding that when
it comes to Stern claims governed under § 157(c)(1), the Bankruptcy Court would be permitted
to submit its findings of fact and law to the District Court for de novo review).
58. Id. at 28.
59. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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Since 2014, functionalist reasoning has made a significant
comeback in the pages of the U.S. Reports.60 A reliable majority of
the Supreme Court has embraced functionalism and done so with
brio.61 In cases such as Bank Markazi v. Peterson,62 Patchak v.
Zinke,63 and Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group,64
the Supreme Court issued opinions that emphasize balancing and
the potential efficiency of novel administrative structures involving
judicial functions over the strict enforcement of the separation of
powers in general and Article III’s Vesting Clause in particular.65
Thus, the Justices have abandoned the strict formalism of Stern and
Executive Benefits Insurance Agency in favor of giving Congress
broad discretion to enact laws that do not merely transfer disputes
to non-Article III tribunals but actually mandate particular
outcomes in specific cases currently pending before the Article III
courts at the time Congress acts.66 In theory, a constitutional rule,
60. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
61. For a thoughtful and comprehensive discussions of “formalism” and “functionalism”
in approaching separation of powers questions, see Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,”
the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56
UCLA L. REV. 837, 854-55, 860-62, 870-78 (2009). Briefly, formalism “emphasizes the
necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of government based on functions: one to
legislate, one to execute, and one to adjudicate.” Id. at 860. Contrast this with functionalism,
which “posits that overlap beyond the [three] core functions is practically necessary and even
desirable.” Id. at 861.
62. See generally 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (affirming that Congress may direct courts to
apply newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation in pending civil cases).
63. See generally 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018) (plurality opinion) (holding that Congress’s
targeted statutes comported with Article III so long as they did not cross the line from
legislative to judicial power).
64. See 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1378 (2018) (holding that “matters governed by the public-rights
doctrine, from their nature can be resolved in multiple ways: Congress can reserve to itself
the power to decide, delegate that power to executive officers, or commit it to judicial
tribunals” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65. See Gary Lawson, Territorial Government and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 853, 857-58 (1990) (explaining that under a formalist approach to the enforcement of the
separation of powers, a reviewing court should assess which branch possesses constitutional
authority over a particular government power, that is, whether it is fundamentally legislative,
executive, or judicial in character, and then require that the branch to which a power belongs,
and no other, exercise that power).
66. In Bank Markazi, Peterson and a group of other plaintiffs sought to execute monetary
judgments for injuries and deaths caused by terrorist acts allegedly sponsored by the Iranian
government. Id. at 1318-21. While the cases were pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1316, 1320.
Section 8772 of this statute provides that “the financial assets that are identified in and the
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dating back to 1872 and United States v. Klein, and arguably earlier
to United States v. Schooner Peggy,67 prohibits Congress from
dictating the outcomes of cases in the Article III courts.68 Yet, as one
commentator wryly observes, the Supreme Court has observed this
rule-of-decision limitation more often in the breach than in the
observance.69
subject of proceedings in the [S.D.N.Y.] in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al.,”
28 U.S.C. § 8772(b), “shall be subject to execution ... in order to satisfy any judgment to the
extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury
or death caused by an act of [terrorism].” Id. § 8772(a)(1). Peterson and the other plaintiffs
then moved for summary judgment based on the newly passed congressional statute. Bank
Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320-21. Bank Markazi argued that the congressional statute violated
the separation of powers doctrine because the law was precisely directed at establishing a rule
of decision in this specific litigation. Id. at 1321-22. The district court granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Id.
at 1321-22. In the end, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision by holding that the
congressional statute merely changed the applicable governing law. See id. at 1325, 1329
(upholding a statute that effectively directed the outcome in a pending case and observing
that “we have affirmed [that] Congress may indeed direct courts to newly enacted, outcome-
altering legislation in pending civil cases”). But cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
128, 147-48 (1872) (striking down a statute that stripped jurisdiction from the Court of Claims
and Supreme Court over certain claims based on presidential pardons because it imposed a
rule of decision in pending judicial cases and, accordingly, usurped the authority of the Article
III courts).
67. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (announcing, for
the first time, what is now known as the Changed Law Rule); see also J. Richard Doidge, Is
Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the Separation of Powers?: Rethinking United States
v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 910, 953-64 (1994) (explaining how Klein, along with Schooner
Peggy and Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., stands for the Changed Law
Rule); Evan C. Zoldan, The Vanishing Core of Judicial Independence, 21 NEV. L.J. (forth-
coming 2021) (manuscript at 24-27) (explaining the relationship between Schooner Peggy and
Klein as they relate to the Changed Law Rule). 
68. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146. Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase observed that the
statute at issue in Klein, which made the federal courts’ jurisdiction turn on their proposed
merits ruling, “is founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending,
prescribed by Congress” and such a law “is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of
Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power.” Id. Because
the statute made a federal court’s jurisdiction turn on the merits ruling, permitting
jurisdiction only if the merits ruling would favor the government, the majority concluded that
“Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power,” and invalidated the statute as unconstitutional. Id. at 147-48.
69. The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Leading Cases, 132 HARV.L.REV. 297, 302-03 (2018)
(analyzing the holding of Patchak v. Zinke and observing that “[t]he Court hasn’t identified
a rule-of-decision violation since Klein; it seems increasingly likely that it never will”); see
Evan C. Zoldan, The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and the Self-Dealing Solution, 74 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 2133, 2136-37 (2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s commitment to
meaningfully enforcing the rule against Congress dictating outcomes in cases sub judice is
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Thus, despite Chief Justice Roberts’s strenuous objections,70 a
majority of the Justices seems largely unconcerned about the
prospect of Congress usurping small pieces of the Article III courts’
constitutional duties.71 More troubling, these functionalist decisions
do not carefully articulate and apply any limiting principle to
Congress’s use of these devices.72 Admitting the principle that,
consistent with the separation of powers, Congress may dictate
outcomes in specific cases and also permit pending judicial business
to be transferred to non-Article III tribunals opens a Pandora’s box
that might best be left tightly shut.73
As the Greek playwright Euripides aptly observed, bad begin-
nings make for bad endings.74 Although the laws at issue in Bank
Markazi, Patchak, and Oil States Energy all involved relatively
minor attacks on the authority of the Article III courts,75 by
approving these devices as consistent with the separation of powers
doctrine, the Justices have left the door open to Congress using
these devices more regularly and aggressively.76 The cumulative
open to serious doubt based on its failure to apply the rule to invalidate legislation that seems
to usurp judicial decisional authority in specific pending cases).
70. See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 918-21 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(objecting to the plurality’s failure to fully and fairly apply the Klein principle and arguing
that the plurality failed to establish “any limitations on Congress’s power to determine
judicial results” and vested Congress with the power “to pick winners and losers in pending
litigation as it pleases”); Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1330 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing
that the statute making Iranian bank assets available to satisfy judgments in a single case
was nothing more than a statute directing that a particular litigant should win and objecting
that “[n]o less than if it had passed a law saying ‘respondents win,’ Congress has decided this
case by enacting a bespoke statute tailored to this case that resolves the parties’ specific legal
disputes to guarantee respondents victory”).
71. See, e.g., Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905 (plurality opinion) (stating that the “kind of legal
change” seen in Patchak “is well within Congress’s authority and does not violate Article III”);
Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (holding that Congress’s actions constituted “no violation
of separation-of-powers principles, and no threat to the independence of the Judiciary”).
72. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 454 (1991)
(highlighting the danger “that once a reviewing court begins down those roads [of ‘functional’
or ‘balancing’ analysis] in the enforcement of separation of powers, no meaningful limitations
on inter-branch usurpation of power remain”).
73. See id.
74. EURIPIDES, Aeolus, fragment 32, in FRAGMENTS: AEGEUS-MELEAGER 12, 29
(Christopher Collard & Martin Cropp eds. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2008) (“A bad end
comes from a bad beginning.”).
75. See infra notes 424-60 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 446-52 and accompanying text.
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effects of more instances of congressional case snatching would be
deeply problematic because the sum total effects can and would
greatly exceed the sum of the parts.77
B. The Waxing and Waning of Formalism in Separation of Powers
Analysis in the Contemporary Supreme Court
The Supreme Court’s most recent return to functionalism in
separation of powers analysis simply reflects the latest twist and
turn in a long history of judicial vacillation and analytical inconsis-
tency.78 As Professor Martin Redish and his coauthor, Elizabeth
Cisar, have observed, “[t]he Court has gone from one extreme to the
other, with the assertion of what are at best tenuous distinctions”
to justify the use of one analytical methodology or the other.79
In cases involving novel administrative structures that redistrib-
uted executive and legislative responsibilities, the Burger Court
frequently adopted a highly formalist stance and invalidated efforts
to innovate new relationships between Congress and the
President.80 Most of these efforts involved Congress attempting to
give itself a larger role in the implementation of statutes.81 By the
late 1980s, under the Rehnquist Court, the pendulum swung back
toward a more consistently functionalist approach; the Supreme
Court sustained the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act82 and the Federal Sentencing Commission83 in
decisions with a decidedly functionalist cast.84
77. See infra notes 443-60 and accompanying text.
78. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 72, at 450 (“In the separation of powers area, however,
the modern Court has evinced something of a split personality, seemingly wavering from
resort to judicial enforcement with a formalistic vengeance to use of a so-called ‘functional’
approach that appears to be designed to do little more than rationalize incursions by one
branch of the federal government into the domain of another.”).
79. Id.
80. To be sure, some Burger Court decisions, such as Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor, involved efforts to encroach on the authority of the federal courts and
these decisions featured functionalist, rather than formalist, reasoning and outcomes. See
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-59 (1983). 
81. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957-59.
82. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988).
83. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
84. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 72, at 450-53, 476-78.
2021] AGAINST CONGRESSIONAL CASE SNATCHING 813
Beginning in 2010, however, the Supreme Court struck out on a
decidedly more formalist path and invalidated a two-layer system
of “good-cause protection” within an independent federal agency,85
as well as the involuntary litigation of common law claims before
bankruptcy courts.86 However, as with earlier majorities embracing
formalist reasoning in separation of powers disputes, the Supreme
Court once again has drifted back toward functionalism—most
notably in Patchak 87 and Bank Markazi.88 A brief discussion of
formalism and functionalism will help to establish precisely why
Patchak, Bank Markazi, and Oil States Energy all constitute
functionalist rulings.
Since the New Deal, formalism and functionalism have served as
the two principal approaches to enforcement of the separation of
powers of doctrine.89 Formalism is a categorical approach that
considers the nature of a particular government power, asks to
which branch the Constitution assigns the power, and then
ascertains if that branch, rather than another branch, is actually
exercising that power.90 For formalists, the intentions of the
Framers—to the extent one can ascertain those intentions—should
be controlling and Congress lacks constitutional authority to
85. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484, 496 (2010)
(holding that Congress’s imposition of dual good-cause removal provisions was “contrary to
Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President” and explaining “[w]ithout the
ability to oversee the Board, or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee,
the President is no longer the judge of the Board’s conduct”). The Free Enterprise Fund
majority explained that “[i]ndeed, if allowed to stand, this dispersion of responsibility could
be multiplied. If Congress can shelter the bureaucracy behind two layers of good-cause tenure,
why not a third?” Id. at 497. What is true of insulating executive officers from presidential
oversight also holds true of imposing rules of decision in particular cases pending before the
Article III courts. See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 919 (2018) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (explaining that, by allowing Congress to impose a rule of decision and thereby
disperse judicial authority, “the plurality disavows any limitations on Congress’s power to
determine judicial results, conferring on the Legislature a colonial-era authority to pick
winners and losers in pending litigation as it pleases”).
86. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011) (“Article III could neither serve its purpose
in the system of checks and balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial decisionmaking if
the other branches of the Federal Government could confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’
on entities outside Article III.”).
87. See Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 906-08 (plurality opinion).
88. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson,136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323-29 (2016).
89. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
495-96 (1987).
90. Redish & Cisar, supra note 72, at 454, 455 n.24.
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reallocate or rearrange the assignment of specific powers to
particular branches of the federal government.91 As Professor Cass
Sunstein explains, “Formalist decisions are premised on the beliefs
that the text of the Constitution and the intent of its drafters are
controlling and sometimes dispositive, that changed circumstances
are irrelevant to constitutional outcomes, and that broader ‘policy’
concerns should not play a role in legal decisions.”92
Functionalism, as its name implies, constitutes a more flexible
approach to enforcing the separation of powers doctrine that
emphasizes balancing and considers carefully the benefits and
efficiencies that novel administrative structures might provide.93 So
long as a novel administrative structure does not cut too deeply into
the core or central powers of one of the three branches, the federal
courts should tolerate some play in the joints if the benefits of doing
so are sufficiently weighty.94
To be sure, several thoughtful and well-informed legal scholars
have questioned the utility of the formalism/functionalism dichot-
omy. For example, Provost Elizabeth Magill argues that “[t]he
debate over formalism and functionalism is a distraction, masking
a robust consensus to which nearly all participants in the debate
subscribe.”95 Instead of the traditional dichotomy, she proposes an
approach that “match[es] the exercise of certain types of government
authority with specific types of government decisionmakers”96 as
part of “a reconstructed separation of powers doctrine.”97 Magill
concludes that the dichotomy constitutes “an unhelpful way to
evaluate whether an institutional arrangement is constitutional.”98
91. Id. at 449-56. But cf. Sunstein, supra note 89, at 493 (observing that a formalist
approach to enforcing the separation of powers doctrine “rests on weak foundations” and “is
vulnerable to a wide range of objections relating to the appropriate characterization of the
framers’ intent, the problem of interpretive intent, and the question how intent should be
treated in unforeseen circumstances”).
92. Sunstein, supra note 89, at 493.
93. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492-96 (1987).
94. See Jellum, supra note 61, at 870-73.
95. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA.L.REV.
1127, 1129 (2000).
96. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 603, 650 (2001).
97. Id. at 660.
98. Id.
2021] AGAINST CONGRESSIONAL CASE SNATCHING 815
Other legal scholars offer very similar critiques of the formal-
ism/functionalism dichotomy. For example, Professor Linda Jellum
posits that “[r]igidly dividing separation of powers analysis into
these two categories, formalism and functionalism, is imperfect.”99
Dean John Manning makes a similar point, positing that “[n]ew
thinking about the legitimacy of strongly purposive reasoning
reveals difficulties with the approach that underlies both strands of
modern separation of powers doctrine.”100 Professor Ed Rubin
strongly argues that the entire conceptual framework used to define
and enforce the separation of powers doctrine badly needs an
update,101 and Professor Bruce Ackerman urges the United States
not to attempt to export its system of separation of powers to other
polities.102
Despite these critiques, and the frequency with which administra-
tive law scholars restate them, the formalism/functionalism
dichotomy remains quite resilient and provides a generally accepted
and effective means of categorizing major separation of powers
doctrine precedents.103 Accordingly, “the distinction retains signifi-
cant explanatory force.”104 It is easy to understand why this is so.
The dichotomy reflects a relatively basic distinction between a
categorical approach to enforcing the separation of powers and a
balancing test.105
As Lee Liberman explains, formalism “uses a syllogistic, defini-
tional approach to determining whether a particular exercise of
power is legislative, executive, or judicial.”106 No balancing is re-
quired—instead, as Magill posits, “[w]hen confronting an institu-
tional arrangement, a formalist, following a rule-like approach,
99. Jellum, supra note 61, at 878.
100. Manning, supra note 24, at 1972.
101. EDWARD L.RUBIN,BEYOND CAMELOT:RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN
STATE 12 (2005).
102. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 640 (2000).
103. See Lawson, supra note 65, at 857 (“Whatever ‘formalism’ and ‘functionalism’ might
mean in the abstract, they have become terms of art in discourse concerning separation of
powers.”).
104. Krotoszynski, supra note 51, at 1611.
105. Cf. RONALD J.KROTOSZYNSKI,JR.,THE DISAPPEARING FIRSTAMENDMENT 16-17, 35-39,
217, 224 (2019) (discussing the relative salience of categorical tests and balancing tests in
First Amendment jurisprudence).
106. Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was
Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 343 (1989).
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identifies the type of power exercised and asks whether it is ex-
ercised by the appropriate department in the appropriate way.”107
Accordingly, as Professor Redish and his coauthor observe, “the
Court’s role in separation of powers cases should be limited to
determining whether the challenged branch action falls within the
definition of that branch’s constitutionally derived powers—
executive, legislative, or judicial” and “[n]o other questions are to be
asked; no other countervailing factors are to be considered.”108
Functionalism, in turn, steadfastly rejects hard and fast rules
(that is, categorical rules) that delimit Congress’s authority to mix
and match legislative, executive, and judicial functions; the
functionalist approach to the separation of powers doctrine features
overt forms of cost/benefit balancing.109 Professor Thomas Merrill
explains that a functionalist views separation of powers questions
“not in terms of fixed rules but rather in light of an evolving
standard designed to advance the ultimate purposes of a system of
separation of powers.”110
Making a different, but related point, Manning observes that
“functionalists view the Constitution as emphasizing the balance,
and not the separation, of powers,”111 and do so, at least in part,
because “the Constitution’s structural clauses ultimately supply few
useful details of meaning.”112 In sum, and as Jellum posits, “[t]he
functionalist approach emphasizes the need to maintain pragmatic
flexibility to respond to modern government.”113 When the Supreme
Court frames a separation of powers question in terms of whether
Congress has “gone too far”—as it did in both Patchak and Bank
Markazi—the decision rests on functionalist grounds and rea-
soning.114
107. Magill, supra note 96, at 608-09.
108. Redish & Cisar, supra note 72, at 454-55.
109. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991
SUP. CT. REV. 225, 231.
110. Id.
111. Manning, supra note 24, at 1952.
112. Id. at 1950.
113. Jellum, supra note 61, at 854-55; see also Magill, supra note 96, at 609 (arguing that
from a functionalist perspective “[t]he key question is whether an institutional arrangement
upsets the overall balance” between and among the three branches of the federal government
“by permitting one of them to compromise the ‘core’ function of another”).
114. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905-08 (2018) (plurality opinion); Bank Markazi
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For the record, we do not assert that functionalism is never an
acceptable methodological choice; our claim is considerably more
limited. Because of the inherent structural weakness of the federal
judiciary,115 the federal courts should exercise extreme caution in
deploying functionalist analysis when deciding whether novel
administrative structures involving the Article III courts are
consistent with the separation of powers doctrine. Because, as
Hamilton explained, the federal judiciary is the least dangerous and
hence the weakest of the three branches of the federal govern-
ment,116 the federal courts “should articulate and apply consistently
a stricter standard of review to interbranch power-sharing arrange-
ments that either expand or contract the duties of Article III
courts.”117 Thus, “[f]ormalism, or some form of neo-[f]ormalism, is
necessary to protect the judiciary” from efforts to poach its constitu-
tional responsibilities.118 A kind of “pragmatic formalism”119 is
requisite—but currently sorely lacking—in separation of powers
theory and practice. Pragmatic formalism120 requires the federal
courts to avoid engaging in highly permissive functionalist analysis
when Congress attempts to snatch judicial business from the federal
courts.
v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016).
115. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 465-66.
116. See id.
117. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and
Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 481 (1997).
118. Id. at 481-82.
119. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 72, at 454-56 (discussing and explaining the concept
of “pragmatic formalism”).
120. See id. (“‘Pragmatic formalism’ ... is a ‘street smart’ mode of interpretation, growing
out of a recognition of the dangers to which a more ‘functional’ or ‘balancing’ analysis in the
separation of powers context may create. It recognizes that once a reviewing court begins
down those roads in the enforcement of separation of powers, no meaningful limitations on
interbranch usurpation of power remain. More importantly, [pragmatic formalism] recognizes
that even if functionalism and balancing could be employed with principled limitation, any
such interpretational approach inherently eviscerates the prophylactic nature of the
separation of powers protections, so essential a part of that system.”).
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II. CONGRESSIONAL CASE SNATCHING IS A REAL AND GROWING
PROBLEM THAT ENDANGERS THE ABILITY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
TO SECURE AND ADVANCE RULE OF LAW VALUES
In recent years, Congress has enacted at least two statutes that
seem to direct outcomes in specific cases. The Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012121 made assets of Iran’s central
bank available for execution of judgment in a single pending case;
the text of the statute helpfully referenced a specific docket
number.122 This law, which was at issue in Bank Markazi v.
Peterson, did not establish a generally applicable rule governing
execution of judgments against national central bank assets.
Instead, it made specific assets held by Bank Markazi available only
to particular plaintiffs seeking to execute judgments.123
An identical problem arose in Patchak v. Zinke, which considered
a challenge to a federal law that provided a rule of decision in a
specific case involving land owned by a Native American tribe
operating a casino.124 As explained below, in both instances, the
Supreme Court sustained Congress’s case snatching behavior by
characterizing the constitutionally questionable statutes as
“changing the law” rather than as imposing a rule of decision on the
federal courts (and thereby usurping a quintessential judicial
function).125
Finally, in Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group,
the Supreme Court also sustained a federal law that permits a
121. 22 U.S.C. § 8772.
122. Id. § 8772(b) (making available Iranian central bank assets “identified in and the
subject of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG),
that were restrained by restraining notices and levies secured by the plaintiffs in those
proceedings”).
123. See 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1330 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“No less than if it had
passed a law saying ‘respondents win,’ Congress has decided this case by enacting a bespoke
statute tailored to this case that resolves the parties’ specific legal disputes to guarantee
respondents victory.”).
124. Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2(b), 128 Stat. 1913,
1915 (2014) (providing that a lawsuit “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and
shall be promptly dismissed”); see Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 904 (2018) (plurality
opinion) (discussing the Gun Lake Act).
125. See infra Part II.A.
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nervous litigant to remove a pending case involving a patent
infringement claim from an Article III court—potentially at any
point in the judicial process, including litigation pending before the
Court of Appeals or even the Supreme Court—back to the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).126 Strictly speaking,
Oil States Energy, the party objecting to the transfer of the case to
the USPTO for inter partes review, did not raise a separation of
powers claim objecting to the procedure, though this procedure
essentially rendered all of the federal court proceedings prior to the
transfer of the dispute to the USPTO nugatory (and arguably
advisory).127 This is a different form of case snatching that involves
Congress only conditionally vesting the adjudication of a legal
dispute with the Article III courts, rather than attempting to decide
the case itself.128 Even so, it is no less objectionable because it has
the effect of making federal court proceedings, and final judgments,
binding on the parties only if Congress allows.129
126. 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370-73, 1379 (2018).
127. See id. at 1372, 1376 (describing Oil States’ arguments). But cf. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 409, 410-11 (1792) (reporting on several lower court cases that invalidated an
administrative scheme under which final federal court decisions involving veterans’ benefits
would be reviewed, and potentially reversed, by the Secretary of War). For a thorough
discussion of Hayburn’s Case, including its somewhat complicated procedural background and
substantive import, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-
Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 438-41 (1996).
128. See Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1373.
129. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410-11 (disallowing review of final judgments
of Article III courts by the Secretary of War); see also Pushaw, supra note 127, at 441 (“Riding
circuit, every Justice agreed that the Constitution’s scheme of separated powers requires
judicial review and bars political branch revision of judicial orders.”). See generally William
W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 266-67 (1973)
(observing that despite Congress’s undoubted power to control the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, this constitutional authority does not extend to “an unpermitted corruption
of the judicial power to decide the case” and emphasizing that “neither may [Congress] seek
to direct the outcome of constitutional adjudication by legislating a rule of decision”). Even
with respect to a public right, such as a veteran’s benefit, Congress may not vest only
conditional authority to decide a public rights question in the Article III courts. Cf. N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-68 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(describing the public rights doctrine as “draw[ing] upon the principle of separation of pow-
ers” and applying only to those matters under historically “exclusive” control of political
branches). In other words, the “greater” power to exclude such disputes entirely from being
heard and decided in the Article III courts does not imply an ostensibly “lesser” power to
vest adjudicatory responsibility in the federal courts on an incomplete or contingent basis.
Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 919 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In sum, Congress may not incom-
pletely or only contingently vest the adjudication of public rights questions in the Article
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Despite some fits and starts, perhaps best exemplified by Stern
v. Marshall’s formalist holding,130 the Supreme Court’s overall
approach to congressional reassignments of judicial duties to non-
Article III entities has been unduly permissive and highly function-
alist. The Justices seem confident in their abilities to monitor and
police separation of powers problems in their own backyard—and
therefore are generally receptive to congressional efforts to usurp or
reassign judicial duties.131
Detailed and careful consideration of Patchak and Oil States
Energy will show that the problem of congressional case snatching
is both real and growing. Simply put, the results in these cases
cannot be reconciled with a serious commitment to protecting the
institutional authority and independence of the Article III courts.132
Finally, we will not provide independent extended treatment of
Bank Markazi because Patchak presents an even more obvious—
and egregious—attempt by Congress to impose a rule of decision in
a pending case.133
A. Patchak v. Zinke: Congress Merely Changing the Law or
Prescribing a Rule of Decision?
Patchak v. Zinke involved a relatively minor dispute over the
trust status of a parcel of land used for a casino run by a Native
American tribe in Michigan.134 Like other important cases featuring
comparatively mundane facts,135 however, it raised an important
III courts. See id.
130. See 564 U.S. 462, 469 (2011).
131. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1986).
Ironically, the Supreme Court has been much more vigilant in strictly enforcing the
separation of powers in cases involving novel power sharing arrangements between Congress
and the President. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
484 (2010). Because Congress and the President have effective tools to check each other, and
the federal courts do not, the judiciary’s active superintendence of the separation of powers
is less critical in this context than it is when Congress attempts to usurp or reassign judicial
duties. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 465-66.
132. See infra Parts II.A-B.
133. See infra Part II.A.
134. 138 S. Ct. at 903 (plurality opinion).
135. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15-17 (1971); see also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: “Inconsequential” Cases and Larger Principles, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1996) (observing that “[j]udges must be able to look beyond the
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constitutional question: May Congress enact a statute that tells the
federal courts the legal effect of another statutory provision?136 The
answer to this question should have been obvious and easy given
the critical importance of maintaining the structural independence
and decisional autonomy of the federal courts.137 Yet, for six
members of the Supreme Court, Congress’s ability to reach into the
Article III courts to “say what the law is” did not violate the
separation of powers.138
1. The Klein Rule
In United States v. Klein, the Supreme Court held that Congress
may not prescribe a rule of decision in a pending case.139 Klein
involved a challenge to a statute that gave the Court of Claims
jurisdiction over claims related to calculating just compensation of
pardoned Confederate Army members’ property taken by Union
troops during the Civil War.140 As former Confederate Army
members obtained favorable judgments from the U.S. Court of
Claims by providing presidential pardons coupled with oaths of
loyalty to the Union, Congress passed a law that retroactively
abolished the Court of Claim’s jurisdiction over suits in which the
merits rested on presidential pardons.141
The Supreme Court held that Congress could not withdraw
jurisdiction depending on whether a federal court was going to rule
for the plaintiff or the government because such an approach
“passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power.”142 Klein established that Congress cannot strip Article III
importance of the particular case before them to the broader implications of their ruling” and
positing that “Cohen provides an excellent example of this phenomenon”).
136. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 910 (plurality opinion).
137. See The FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 466; see also Zoldan, supra note 69, at
2136-37 (providing an overview of the holding in United States v. Klein regarding a rule of
decision and explaining how Article III courts have grappled with separation of powers
problems associated with legislative intrusions into judicial functions).
138. See Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 902 (plurality opinion); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
139. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
140. Id. at 131-32.
141. See id. at 143-44.
142. Id. at 147.
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courts of jurisdiction based “solely on the application of a rule of
decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress.”143 Moreover,
the precedent stands for the proposition that Congress cannot
retroactively strip jurisdiction from Article III courts “as a means to
an end.”144
Klein’s holding is attributed with standing for the Changed Law
Rule,145 which provides that federal courts will apply a revised law
to pending cases, but that this rule applies “only when Congress sets
some kind of policy for the courts to follow.”146 As the Chief Justice
has argued, “‘changing the law’ must imply some measure of
generality or preservation of an adjudicative role for the courts.”147
By way of contrast, when Congress attempts to change the law for
a single litigant in a single case, he posits that Congress “has
pronounced the equivalent of ‘Smith wins’” and violates the
separation of powers doctrine.148
The practical difference between “changing the law” and prescrib-
ing a rule of decision can be ephemeral.149 Some legal scholars
suggest that Congress actually changes the law, even in the Klein
context, if it simply passes a statute prescribing a rule of decision
without instructing the federal courts on how to apply it.150 We
believe that the difference lies in tinkering with the power to render
143. Id. at 146.
144. Id. at 145.
145. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (announcing what
is now known as the Changed Law Rule); see also Doidge, supra note 67, at 953-64; Zoldan,
supra note 67 (manuscript at 24-27). 
146. Evan C. Zoldan, Is the Federal Judiciary Independent of Congress?, 70 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 135, 139 (2018); see Zoldan, supra note 69, at 2206-07 (discussing the distinction
between changing the law and prescribing a rule of decision for a pending case and the
importance of a law’s generality to enforcing this distinction).
147. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 920 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Doidge,
supra note 67, at 959-63 (discussing and explaining the Changed Law Rule and its explication
in United States v. Klein).
148. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
149. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Patchak, 138 S. Ct. 897 (No. 16-498) (featuring
Justice Elena Kagan pressing counsel to articulate the elusive difference between section 2(b)
and a constitutional jurisdiction-stripping statute).
150. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the
Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory
Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1079 (1999).
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a decision (allowed) and directly ordering a disposition in a pending
case (prohibited).151
United States v. Winstar Corporation demonstrates the potential
elusiveness of the distinction.152 In Winstar, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board encouraged banks in good standing to take over failing
thrifts through mergers; in return, the healthy banks were promised
supervisory goodwill and capital credits that counted toward capital
reserve requirements imposed by federal regulations.153 Congress
subsequently enacted a statute that retroactively prohibited the
healthy banks from counting the goodwill capital credits in com-
puting the required reserves, which forced many of the merged
institutions into insolvency.154 A few of the healthy banks that had
since run into financial troubles after the merger and passage of
the statute challenged it on separation of powers grounds.155
The Supreme Court invalidated the law because Congress had
retroactively directed the merits outcome by shifting costs in this
particular case to three banks after promising to provide them with
goodwill toward their calculations of capital reserve requirements.156
Thus, the Court found that the statute in Winstar did nothing more
than force costs onto particular parties in a specific case; on these
facts, the statute lacked the requisite generality to constitute a
change in the law rather than a rule of decision.157
In both Klein and Winstar, the Court found that Congress was
violating the separation of powers; Congress snatched cases from
the Article III courts by enacting statutes that did nothing more
than decide a pending case in favor of one party.158 This reasoning
should have applied in Patchak (and Bank Markazi as well)—but it
did not.159 Because Patchak’s Gun Lake Act failed to “change the
law” within the meaning of Klein, it constitutes a usurpation of
151. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 436 (1992).
152. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
153. Id. at 845-49.
154. Id. at 856-58.
155. Id. at 858.
156. Id. at 901-03.
157. Id. at 900, 902-03.
158. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871); Winstar, 518 U.S. at 900.
159. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 908 (2018) (plurality opinion).
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judicial power rather than an appropriate exercise of legislative
power.160
2. Patchak v. Zinke
The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians,
also known as the Gun Lake Tribe, is a Native American tribe that
resides in southwestern Michigan.161 The Gun Lake Tribe has lived
in the United States for hundreds of years.162 However, the U.S.
Secretary of Interior did not formally recognize the tribe until
1999.163 After the U.S. federal government officially recognized the
Gun Lake Tribe, the tribe petitioned the Secretary to place a tract
of land, called the Bradley Property, into trust; it planned to build
and operate a casino on the parcel.164 In May 2005, the Secretary of
Interior “agreed and posted a notice informing the public that the
Bradley Property would be taken into trust for the Band.”165
Eventually, in February 2011, the Gun Lake Tribe opened its
casino.166
However, shortly before the Secretary placed the Bradley
Property in trust, a neighboring landowner, David Patchak, filed an
action challenging the Secretary’s decision as a violation of the
160. Id. at 908 n.5.
161. Id. at 903.
162. Id. There is evidence of a relationship between the Gun Lake Tribe and the United
States that dates back as early as 1795 when the two parties began negotiating treaties. Id.
The Gun Lake Tribe maintains an official website that provides a detailed history of their
tribe. See Gun Lake Tribe History, MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND OF POTTAWATOMI
INDIANS, https://gunlaketribe-nsn.gov/about/our-heritage/ [https://perma.cc/X4HG-KXNW].
163. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services from the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 65 Fed. Reg. 13,298 (2000); Final Determination to Acknowledge the
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,936
(Oct. 14, 1998).
164. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(B) (providing that recognized Indian tribes may operate casinos
on “Indian lands,” which include lands “held in trust by the United States for the benefit of
any Indian tribe”). The Gun Lake Tribe “identified a 147-acre parcel of land in Wayland,
known as the Bradley Property, where it wanted to build a casino. The [tribe] asked the
Secretary to invoke the Indian Reorganization Act, § 5, 48 Stat. 985, 25 U.S.C. § 5108, and
take the Bradley Property into trust.” Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 903 (plurality opinion).
165. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 903 (plurality opinion); Notice of Determination, 70 Fed. Reg.
25,596 (May 2, 2005).
166. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 903 (plurality opinion).
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Indian Reorganization Act.167 The Secretary argued that Patchak’s
suit was “barred by sovereign immunity and that Patchak lacked
prudential standing to bring it.”168 The district court ruled in favor
of the Department of the Interior,169 but the U.S. Court of Appeals
reversed this ruling.170 The Supreme Court granted review and
affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.171
In Patchak I, the Supreme Court held both that Patchak had
prudential standing and that the Secretary waived sovereign
immunity, allowing Patchak’s suit to go forward.172 The Justices
remanded the case for further proceedings.173 However, the tribe
decided that the litigation presented an existential threat to its
newly opened casino; accordingly, it decided to seek the aid of
Congress in fending off Patchak’s suit.174 The tribe’s efforts proved
to be wildly successful—they obtained enactment of a statute aimed
at ending, once and for all, Patchak’s lawsuit.175
In 2014, while Patchak’s suit was still pending in the District
Court, Congress enacted the Gun Lake Act.176 Pursuant to section
2(a), the Bradley Property was “reaffirmed as trust land, and the
actions of the Secretary of the Interior in taking that land into trust
167. Id. Patchak argued that under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702,
706(2), “the Secretary lacked statutory authority to take the Bradley Property into trust for
the Band. [Furthermore,] the Indian Reorganization Act [IRA] does not allow the Secretary
to take land into trust for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction when the statute was
enacted in 1934.” Id. (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382-83 (2009)). Therefore,
because the federal government did not recognize the Gun Lake Tribe until 1999, it was
arguably too late for the Bradley Property to be put into trust for the band under the terms
of the IRA. Id.
168. Id.
169. Patchak v. Salazar, 646 F. Supp. 2d 72, 76 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 632 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
170. Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 704-07 (D.C. Cir. 2011), aff ’d, 567 U.S. 209 (2012).
171. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak (Patchak I), 567
U.S. 209, 211 (2012).
172. Id. at 212.
173. Id. at 228.
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are ratified and confirmed.”177 Section 2(b) in turn seeks to tell the
federal courts what to do with section 2(a):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (including
an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment
of this Act) relating to the land described in subsection (a) shall
not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be
promptly dismissed.178
As a result of the enactment of section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act, the
district court did what Congress ordered it to do—it dismissed the
suit for lack of jurisdiction.179 The D.C. Circuit affirmed.180
The Supreme Court again granted review on a single issue:
whether section 2(b) violates separation of powers principles as-
sociated with Article III of the Constitution.181 Section 2(b) of the
statute arguably violates the Klein rule that prohibits Congress
from prescribing a rule of decision to a federal court in a pending
case.182 Congress may write the laws, but the federal courts, not the
Congress, get to interpret them.183
This important separation of powers question badly divided the
Justices. Four Justices held that section 2(b) was constitutional be-
cause Congress had simply altered the substantive law—which Ex
parte McCardle184 permits Congress to do.185 Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, by way of contrast, found that section 2(b) merely re-
versed the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) waiver of sover-
eign immunity.186 Justice Stephen Breyer also voted to sustain the
statute, finding that section 2(b) constituted a jurisdiction-stripping
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Patchak v. Jewell, 109 F. Supp. 3d 152, 156 (D.D.C. 2015).
180. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
181. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 904 (2018) (plurality opinion).
182. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
183. See id.; see also Doidge, supra note 67, at 942-45 (outlining the separation of powers
doctrine and using the Klein case as a prism for the analysis).
184. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (holding that repealing a statute during the pendency
of the cause of action deprived the court of jurisdiction because Congress has the power to
alter the law).
185. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 907 (plurality opinion).
186. Id. at 912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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device—rendering it largely redundant with section 2(a).187 Six
Justices, divided 3-1-2, voted to sustain the statute over Patchak’s
separation of powers objection.188
Writing for the four Justice plurality, Justice Clarence Thomas
began by highlighting that the federal government has three
distinct branches and that each branch holds and exercises a
different power.189 Moreover, Justice Thomas emphasized the
principle of separation of powers, which “among other things,
prevents Congress from exercising the judicial power.”190 Further-
more, the plurality looked to past precedent “[t]o distinguish
between permissible exercises of the legislative power and imper-
missible infringements of the judicial power.”191
Justice Thomas explained that “Congress violates Article III
when it ‘compel[s] ... findings or results under old law. But Congress
does not violate Article III when it ‘changes the law.’”192 He added
that “[o]ne way that Congress can cross the line from legislative
power to judicial power is by ‘usurp[ing] a court’s power to interpret
and apply the law to the [circumstances] before it.’”193 A clear
example of Congress crossing the line would be “a statute that says,
‘In Smith v. Jones, Smith wins.’”194
The plurality concluded that section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act
“changes the law” and was therefore consistent with the separation
of powers doctrine.195 To support this conclusion, Justice Thomas
interpreted section 2(b) as a “jurisdiction-stripping” provision by
187. Id. at 911-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 902 (plurality opinion).
189. Id. at 904.
190. Id. at 905 (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995)).
191. Id. (citing Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 438 (1992)).
192. Id. (alterations in original) (first citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. at 438; and
then citing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218).
193. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (citing Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S.
Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016)). In Bank Markazi, the Supreme Court held that the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, which effectively determined the outcome of
pending litigation, “d[id] not offend ‘separation of powers principles.’” Bank Markazi, 136 S.
Ct. at 1329 (quoting Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000)).
194. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905 (citing Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1323 n.17) (plurality
opinion).
195. Id.
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finding that “[t]he statute uses jurisdictional language.”196 He
explained that statutory language that declares:
an “action” relating to the Bradley Property “shall not be filed or
maintained in a Federal court” ... imposes jurisdictional conse-
quences: Actions relating to the Bradley Property “shall be
promptly dismissed.” Section 2(b) has no exceptions. And it
applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” including
the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.197
It is important to note that section 2(b) does not use the word
“jurisdiction,” and Justice Thomas acknowledges this fact.198 Yet,
the plurality still concluded that section 2(b) should be read as
nothing more than a run-of-the-mill “jurisdiction-stripping statute”
because the statute does not identify any specific elements of
Patchak’s claim for relief.199
The characterization of section 2(b) as a “jurisdiction-stripping
statute” was essential because past precedents have treated similar
jurisdiction-stripping statutes as “‘chang[ing] the law’ for the
purpose of Article III.”200 In Ex parte McCardle, Congress repealed
an 1867 statute that provided jurisdiction for the Supreme Court to
hear appeals in cases denying writs of habeas corpus.201 Military
authorities imprisoned William McCardle, an anti-Reconstruction
newspaper editor from Mississippi; McCardle sought a writ of
habeas corpus ordering his release from military custody.202 After
losing before the Circuit Court of the District of Mississippi,
McCardle appealed the adverse decision to the Supreme Court—but
while the case was pending, Congress repealed the statute
196. Id. at 905-06.
197. Id. at 905 (citations omitted).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 906; see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“[W]hen
[jurisdiction] ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing
the fact and dismissing the cause.”). But cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148
(1871) (holding a statute unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its constitutional
authority when it made the federal courts’ jurisdiction contingent on the outcome on the
merits of a pending case).
200. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 906 (plurality opinion).
201. 74 U.S. (7 Wall) at 514.
202. See Van Alstyne, supra note 129, at 236.
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McCardle had used to seek review of the lower court’s denial of his
petition.203 The Supreme Court sustained Congress’s power to repeal
its appellate jurisdiction over McCardle’s case, because jurisdiction-
stripping statutes do not involve “the exercise of judicial power” or
“legislative interference with courts in the exercising of continuing
jurisdiction.”204
Applying McCardle, the Patchak Court found that section 2(b)
altered the law, rather than dictated a rule of decision in a pending
case, and did not unconstitutionally usurp or interfere with the
ability of the Article III courts to exercise the judicial power of the
United States.205 Justice Thomas also cited Bank Markazi v.
Peterson in support of this outcome.206 He explained that “[t]he Bank
Markazi Court rejected a separation of powers challenge to a statute
similar to the Gun Lake Act, insofar as”207 Congress “may amend
the law and make the change applicable to specific pending cases,
even when the amendment is outcome determinative.”208
Section 2(b), however, is significantly less general than the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 at issue in
Bank Markazi.209 Given that the Patchak majority found the Gun
Lake Act possessed the requisite level of generality to constitute a
change in the governing law, rather than a congressional attempt
to prescribe a rule of decision for a single case and litigant, it
necessarily follows that the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012, which affected the legal rights of a group
of litigants holding judgments from several lawsuits, also possessed
the necessary level of generality to fall under McCardle rather than
Klein.
203. Id. at 237-39.
204. McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) at 514; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 129, at 230, 238-40
(analyzing how Congress has sought either to control the merits of pending litigation within
the federal courts or to limit, if not preclude, the Article III courts from exercising the power
of judicial review).
205. See Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905, 910-11 (plurality opinion).
206. Id. at 905 (citing Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016)).
207. Joseph S. Diedrich, Article III, Judicial Restraint, and This Supreme Court, 72 SMU
L. REV. 235, 241 (2019).
208. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317.
209. See id. at 1320. In the end, the Supreme Court held that the congressional statute
merely changed the applicable governing law. See id. at 1329.
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Justice Breyer, who joined the plurality opinion, also filed a
separate concurrence.210 He reasoned that reading section 2(a) and
section 2(b) together support the conclusion that the separation of
powers had not been violated.211 In his view, section 2(a) simply
“gave the Secretary the authority to take the Bradley Property into
trust” and section 2(b) stated that “federal courts shall not hear
cases challenging the land’s trust status.”212 This reasoning is
puzzling because Justice Breyer seems to blithely admit that section
2(b) imposes a rule of decision on the federal courts in a pending
case—however, in his analysis, this fact possesses little, if any, legal
relevance.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Sotomayor joined, concurred
in the judgment.213 She reasoned that section 2(b) repealed the
waiver of the “[g]overnment’s sovereign immunity from suit” under
the APA.214 Patchak sought relief from the Secretary of Interior
under the APA, which has a “waiver of the Federal Government’s
immunity from suit.”215 Justice Ginsburg explained that the
“consent of the United States to suit may be withdrawn ‘at any
time,’” including during the pendency of litigation within the Article
III courts.216 She concluded that section 2(b) withdrew the APA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity as it applies to the Bradley
Property.217 This reasoning and conclusion allowed Justice Ginsburg
to avoid deciding the separation of powers issue.
Chief Justice Roberts dissented and was joined by Justices
Anthony M. Kennedy and Neil Gorsuch.218 Roberts objected that the
plurality’s approach gave Congress unlimited power to dictate the
outcome of a single pending case.219 In his view, section 2(b) of the
Gun Lake Act violated Article III of the Constitution and the
210. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 911-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 911.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
214. Id.; see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702.
215. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
216. Id. (quoting Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 581 (1934)).
217. Id. at 913 (opining that “Congress acted effectively to displace the APA’s waiver of
immunity for suits against the United States with a contrary command applicable to the
Bradley Property”).
218. Id. at 914 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
219. Id.
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principle of separation of powers.220 This was because Patchak’s suit
was the only pending litigation relating to the Bradley Property
when Congress enacted the Gun Lake Act in 2014; no other
challenges could be brought due to the expiration of the APA’s six-
year statute of limitations.221 Accordingly, the Gun Lake Act was
plainly targeted legislation that directed the outcome of Patchak’s
case—and Patchak’s case alone.
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts correctly observed that section
2(b) of the Gun Lake Act lacked any jurisdiction-stripping
language.222 In prior cases, the Supreme Court had ruled that
Congress must provide a plain statement when it enacts a statute
that establishes new jurisdictional limits.223 Without such a plain
statement, the Supreme Court will treat the statute as
nonjurisdictional.224 In light of these principles, Roberts found that
section 2(b) was not a jurisdiction-stripping statute.225 Instead,
Congress was attempting to use its legislative powers to direct the
outcome of Patchak’s pending suit—a constitutionally impermissible
usurpation of the judicial power under Klein.226
220. Id.
221. Id. at 916-17.
222. Id. at 918-19.
223. See id. (observing that the Court had previously held that “nearly identical statutory
language ‘says nothing about whether a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction’”
(quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 164 (2010))). Moreover, comparing the
statute in Reed Elsevier, which provided that “no civil action ... shall be instituted,” with
section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act highlights the similarities between them. See Reed Elsevier,
559 U.S. at 164; Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2, 128 Stat.
1913 (2014).
224. See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (“To ward off
profligate use of the term ‘jurisdiction,’ we have adopted a ‘readily administrable bright line’
for determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as jurisdictional. We inquire
whether Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ that the rule is jurisdictional; absent such a clear
statement, we have cautioned, ‘courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in
character.’” (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006))). It is also im-
portant to note the unique circumstances and history associated with this case as it deals
with American Indian tribal sovereignty and Congress’s plenary power over the affairs with
and of the Indian tribes. See generally Kendall McCoy, Note, “Perhaps Congress Would,
Perhaps Congress Should”—Why Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians
v. Patchak and Carcieri v. Salazar Must Be Legislatively Overridden to Protect IRA Trust
Acquisition Authority, 43 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 459 (2018-2019) (discussing the rights of tribes
as distinct nations due to their legal status as separate governments that preexist the
Constitution).
225. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 918-19 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 919-20.
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Finally, Chief Justice Roberts addressed the alternative reading
of section 2(b) set forth by Justice Ginsburg. He argued that because
Congress made no “unambiguous intention to withdraw” section
702’s waiver of sovereign immunity, nor used any specific language,
like “immunity” or “United States,” it was implausible to read the
statute as withdrawing the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.227
He acknowledged that Congress may, by express language, repeal
a waiver of sovereign immunity, but he concluded that Congress had
not actually taken this step.228
In our view, the Chief Justice’s dissent possesses the greatest
persuasive force among the four opinions in Patchak because it best
vindicates the Hamiltonian concerns about the inherent structural
weakness of the Article III federal courts. His dissent, far more than
either the plurality opinion or the concurring opinions, articulates
precisely why section 2(b) unconstitutionally intrudes into the
authority of the federal judiciary and ably applies and defends the
separation of powers doctrine in the context of attempted congres-
sional case snatching. After all, under Marbury, the federal
judiciary—not Congress—possesses the constitutional authority to
“say what the law is.”229
Article III of the Constitution confers power on the federal
judiciary to decide cases and controversies,230 which is an essential
aspect of the constitutional system’s checks and balances.231 The
Article III courts, not Congress, have the power to interpret and
apply law, which “‘can no more be shared’ with another branch than
‘the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the
veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to
override a Presidential veto.’”232 Essentially, Article III “sets out not
only what the Judiciary can do, but also what Congress cannot.”233
227. Id. at 921-22.
228. Id.
229. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)
(“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to
another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever
authority has been committed ... is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution.”).
230. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
231. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011).
232. Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974)).
233. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 915 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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In 2014, when Congress passed the Gun Lake Act, it plainly
sought to determine the result for one individual’s lawsuit.234
Congress’s enactment of the Gun Lake Act effectively told the
Article III courts how to interpret section 2(a) in a pending case; it
set forth a rule of decision that marked a clear violation of the
separation of powers.235 Simply put, Congress lacks the constitu-
tional authority to enact a law that orders the federal judiciary to
interpret and apply statutory language in a specific way.236 Yet,
section 2(b) has precisely this purpose and effect.
To be sure, Article III provides Congress with the power to create
lower federal courts and to determine their jurisdiction.237 Congress,
not the Article III courts, enjoys the power to control the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.238 Consistent with these principles, Congress
possessed constitutional authority to withdraw the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to hear any lawsuit involving the Bradley
Property.239 Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion invokes Ex parte
McCardle in support of this outcome.240 What is more, the federal
courts will not look into the specific reasons that motivated
Congress to withdraw jurisdiction if this is actually what Congress
has done.241 In sum, even if Congress could validly withdraw the
234. See id. at 904 (plurality opinion) (discussing Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act,
Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014)).
235. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
236. Id.; Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 n.17 (2016) (opining that
Congress lacks constitutional authority to enact a statute that directs the outcome of a
hypothetical pending case that provides that in “‘Smith v. Jones,’ ‘Smith wins’”); see also
RICHARD FALLON,JOHNMANNING,DANIEL MELTZER &DAVID SHAPIRO,HART AND WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 324 (7th ed. 2015) (“Whatever else the Court
may have had in mind, it is surely right, isn’t it, that not every congressional attempt to
influence the outcome of cases, even if phrased in jurisdictional language, can be justified as
a valid exercise of a power over jurisdiction?”).
237. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (conferring on Congress the power to create, or not create, the
lower federal courts); see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (7 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Courts created by
statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”).
238. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2; see also Jellum, supra note 61, at 882-92 (discussing
when statutory directives disrupt the balance between Article III courts and Congress,
thereby crossing the constitutional line, and accordingly violate the separation of powers
doctrine).
239. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 903-05 (plurality opinion).
240. Id. at 905.
241. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (holding that the Supreme Court
will not question Congress’s decision to withdraw jurisdiction from Article III courts); see
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jurisdiction of the Article III courts, it could not dictate to them how
to interpret and apply the Gun Lake Act.242
Of course, Justice Thomas would claim, counterfactually, that the
Gun Lake Act does not apply only to Patchak’s claim but also
“creates new law for suits relating to the Bradley Property.”243 From
this vantage point, the Gun Lake Act decides not just Patchak’s
claim but also any and all future claims that might arise relating to
the government taking the Bradley Property into trust. Thus, the
Gun Lake Act could be characterized as setting a government policy
and ultimately changing the law, not in violation of Klein but in
agreement with the holding in Ex parte McCardle.244
With that said, however, it is a stretch (and a big one) to claim
with a straight face that the Gun Lake Act sets a general policy
when the statute’s only possible legal effect is to retroactively
protect a single government action. Additionally, the statute neither
amended the Indian Reorganization Act nor changed the standards
for how the government takes lands into trust.245 Furthermore, the
Gun Lake Act did not impact any other tracts of land—only the
Bradley Property.246 Most importantly, when Congress enacted the
Gun Lake Act in 2014, the only pending lawsuit was Patchak’s
action relating to the Bradley Property; no other challenges could
ever be filed because the APA’s six-year statute of limitations had
expired.247 Thus, it is quite obvious that the Gun Lake Act consti-
tuted targeted legislation enacted with the purpose and effect of
directing the outcome in Patchak’s case.
Congress effectively snatched the Article III courts’ power to
interpret and apply the law—here the Gun Lake Act—by enacting
Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation
of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1593-1605 (1986)
(discussing McCardle and the political circumstances that framed the Supreme Court’s
decision); Jellum, supra note 61, at 845 (“Federal statutes that provide a rule of decision
violate federal separation of powers.”).
242. But see Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905-06 (plurality opinion).
243. Id. at 908.
244. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1874). But see Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514-15.
245. See Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 1603, 128 Stat.
1913 (2014).
246. Id.
247. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 916-17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
2021] AGAINST CONGRESSIONAL CASE SNATCHING 835
a statute that simply tells the federal courts how to rule in
Patchak’s case.248 The plurality’s reasoning and outcome set a
dangerous precedent that chips away at the viability of Klein.249 If
the Supreme Court continues to endorse congressional case
snatching of this sort, Congress will surely resort to this device with
greater frequency to dispense political favors to litigants with the
ability to seek and hold Congress’s attention.250
3. Bills of Attainder and the Presumption Against 
Implied Repeal
Other constitutional considerations augur in favor of invalidating
section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act. Chief Justice Roberts emphasized
in his Patchak dissent that American constitutional jurisprudence
favors legislative generality and disfavors targeted legislation.251
This is supported by the text of the Constitution, which disavows
legislation with limited generality.252 Salient examples include the
clauses prohibiting Bills of Attainder,253 Titles of Nobility,254 Ex Post
Facto laws,255 laws impairing the obligation of contracts,256 and the
Takings Clause.257 The clause with the most potential relevance to
Patchak is plainly the Bill of Attainder Clause.258
248. Zoldan, supra note 67 (manuscript at 7, 19-24) (arguing that the core of judicial
independence is the power of the courts to resolve cases pending before them without
legislative interference). 
249. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
250. It is important to note a key distinction. Congress may change the substantive laws,
and the federal courts will give effect to such changes; Congress may also modify the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and even the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-14 (1868) (holding that Congress
could eliminate the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in a pending case without violating the
Constitution). However, Congress cannot change the law for a single litigant in a single case,
such as pronouncing the equivalent of “Smith wins” because it violates the separation of
powers doctrine. See Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 914-15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
251. See Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 915 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).




256. Id. art. I, § 10.
257. Id. amend. V.
258. Id. art. I, § 9. See generally Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ.
L. REV. 625 (2014) (discussing the Bill of Attainder, Titles of Nobility, Ex Post Facto,
Contracts, and Taking Clauses, and their historical connection with a value of legislative
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Under Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the Constitution, “[n]o Bill
of Attainder ... shall be passed.”259 Essentially, a bill of attainder is
targeted legislation that affects only specific individuals and
imposes punishment without judicial process.260 Thus, the Consti-
tution prohibits the federal government from enacting laws that
impose legislative punishment.261 James Madison explained that
“[b]ills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the
obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the
social compact and to every principle of sound legislation.”262
The Supreme Court has held that “the Bill of Attainder Clause
[i]s not to be given a narrow historical reading (which would exclude
bills of pains and penalties),” but should be construed to prohibit
“legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically
designated persons or groups.”263 This approach is necessary to
effectuate the separation of powers rule that prohibits Congress
from “exercis[ing] the powers and office of judge.”264
The Supreme Court has established a three-part test for deter-
mining when legislation violates the Bill of Attainder Clause.265 To
violate this clause, legislation must (1) target specific individuals or
groups; (2) include punishment; and (3) fail to provide judicial
process (that is, a trial).266 The Court has a narrow definition of
generality).
259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
260. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (“A bill of attainder may affect
the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both.”); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 641-56 (2d ed. 1988) (providing an overview of
bills of attainder). See generally Anthony Dick, The Substance of Punishment Under the Bill
of Attainder Clause, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1177 (2011) (providing discussions of cases in which the
Supreme Court found violations of the Bill of Attainder Clause).
261. See Blawis v. Bolin, 358 F. Supp. 349, 353-54 (D. Ariz. 1973) (holding that the
Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S.C. § 842, which disenfranchised the Communist Party
and its affiliates and had as its stated purpose the proscription of the party from the political
process, inflicted legislative “punishment” for purposes of applying the Bill of Attainder
Clause); In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 F. 437, 439 (C.C.D. Or. 1888) (holding unconstitutional a law
that inflicted punishment, in the form of banishment or exile, on a U.S. citizen on bill of
attainder grounds).
262. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
263. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965) (citing Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827)).
264. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (6 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866).
265. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 143-44 (1951) (Black,
J., concurring) (articulating the elements of an unlawful bill of attainder).
266. Id.
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punishment, and therefore, legislation is rarely invalidated under
the Bill of Attainder Clause.267
In Bank Markazi v. Peterson, victims of terrorism as well as the
personal representatives of the victims’ estates brought an action
against Iran for the injuries and deaths associated with terrorist
attacks allegedly supported by the government of Iran.268 However,
their judgments against Iran could not be fulfilled by assets in the
United States, so they brought claims against Bank Markazi, Iran’s
central bank.269 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not
permit a central bank’s assets to be reached to satisfy judgments
against the bank’s home country.270 This led Congress to enact the
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, which
permitted claims against Iran to be satisfied with Bank Markazi’s
assets in the United States.271
More specifically, Congress provided that the “financial assets
that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ.
4518 (BSJ) (GWG)” would be available “to satisfy any judgment ...
awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death
caused by” acts of terrorism.272 Thus, the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act clearly applied only to a single action to
enforce outstanding judgments against Bank Markazi that had been
brought by these particular plaintiffs.273 Nevertheless, the Supreme
267. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Int. Rsch. Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984)
(holding that denial of noncontractual government benefits, such as financial aid, did not
constitute legislative punishment); see also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 470-
72 (1977) (holding that requiring former President Richard M. Nixon to turn over his Oval
Office recordings and papers to the General Services Administration did not constitute
legislative punishment and accordingly did not violate the Bill of Attainder Clause). However,
the Supreme Court has held that categorical exclusion from current or future government
employment constitutes a form of legislative punishment. See United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437, 449-50 (1965).
268. 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1319-20 (2016).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1318.
271. Id. at 1318-19.
272. 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1), (b)(2); see Evan C. Zoldan, Legislative Design and the
Controllable Costs of Special Legislation, 78 MD. L. REV. 415, 440-42 (2019) (arguing that
Congress’s enactment of special legislation or targeted legislation, as in Bank Markazi,
presents serious constitutional issues and should probably be deemed unconstitutional).
273. Zoldan, supra note 272, at 440-42.
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Court did not invalidate the Iran Threat Reduction statute as a
violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause (or on more general Klein
separation of powers grounds).274
However, the Court could have avoided the Bill of Attainder
Clause by simply enforcing the holding of Klein in Bank Markazi
and Patchak.275 In our view, as in Klein, the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act and the Gun Lake Act were statutes
that directed a rule of decision.276 Both statutes applied only to
specific litigants named in the language of the respective statutes.277
In Patchak, it is difficult to see how the legislative effect of section
2(b) does anything other than serve to prescribe a rule of decision.278
Similarly, in Bank Markazi, the legislative effect of the statute
imposed a rule of decision by allowing select, specifically identified
judgments to be executed against assets held by Iran’s central bank,
Bank Markazi.279
So much for Justice Thomas’s argument that the Gun Lake Act
changed the law.280 What about Justice Ginsburg’s argument that
the statute repealed the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity?281 In
our view, Justice Ginsburg states a valid legal rule—but a rule that
simply does not apply to the facts at bar in Patchak.
In finding that the Gun Lake Act restored the federal govern-
ment’s sovereign immunity, Justice Ginsburg posits that “[w]hat
Congress grants, it may retract.”282 This is certainly true. Neverthe-
less, it begs the question of what Congress must do in order to
effectively revise a general waiver of sovereign immunity. In the
APA, and more specifically section 702,283 Congress gave its consent
to Patchak’s suit seeking judicial review of the Department of the
Interior’s decision to take the Bradley Property into trust.284 Justice
274. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317.
275. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
276. Id. at 145-46.
277. 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1)(C), (b)(2); Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No.
113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014).
278. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 921 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
279. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1330 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
280. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 908 (plurality opinion).
281. Id. at 912-13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
282. Id. at 912.
283. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
284. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S.
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Ginsburg’s concurrence rests on a finding of an implied repeal of
section 702’s waiver of sovereign immunity.285
Congress is free to take away jurisdiction given or to reinstate
sovereign immunity after waiving it.286 Thus, if the Gun Lake Act
actually reinstated sovereign immunity, it would preclude the
federal courts from hearing and deciding Patchak’s suit on the
merits.287 However, nothing in section 2(b) suggests any intention to
repeal section 702’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Simply put,
Congress failed to express an unambiguous intention to withdraw
the waiver of sovereign immunity. Nor did the Gun Lake Act use
any language, such as “sovereign immunity” or “consent to be sued,”
that even remotely suggested a congressional intent to reinstate
sovereign immunity.288
A strong presumption against implied repeal constitutes a
bedrock principle of statutory interpretation.289 As Justice Antonin
Scalia and his coauthor, Bryan Garner, explain, “[r]epeals by
implication are disfavored—‘very much disfavored.’”290 At the same
time, however, they caution that “a provision that flatly contradicts
an earlier-enacted provision repeals it.”291 As a general rule of
209, 211-12 (2012).
285. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 913 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Diedrich, supra note 207, at 241
(describing, discussing, and critiquing Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in Patchak, and
noting that her conclusion that section 2(b) revoked section 702’s waiver of sovereign
immunity “decided the case for Ginsburg” and allowed her to elide larger separation of powers
issues that the Gun Lake Act otherwise implicated (quoting Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 912-14
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
286. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868); see also Van Alstyne, supra note
129, at 267-68 (positing that “Congress may not overrule or reverse a decision of [the
Supreme] Court on any matter involving an interpretation of the Constitution[;] neither may
it seek to direct the outcome of constitutional adjudication by legislating a rule of decision
which, if applied, would produce a judgment that the Constitution forbids” and also arguing
that Congress may not “accomplish that result by legislating the selective removal of
constitutional questions while otherwise providing that an affirmative decision shall issue on
the merits of the case”).
287. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 913 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
288. Id. at 921-22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
289. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 327 (2012).
290. Id. (citing JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *467 n.1 (Charles M.
Barnes ed., 13th ed. 1884)).
291. Id. (citing JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *467 n.1 (Charles M.
Barnes ed., 13th ed. 1884)); see United States v. Noce, 268 U.S. 613, 619 (1925) (“Implied
repeals are not favored.”).
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thumb, “if statutes are to be repealed, they should be repealed with
some specificity.”292
David Patchak initially brought a claim under the APA, which
waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity.293 Section 702
of the APA provides that a suit “shall not be dismissed ... on the
ground that it is against the United States.”294 Section 2(b) provided
that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, an action
(including an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of
enactment of this Act) relating to the land described in subsection
(a) shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be
promptly dismissed.”295 Applying the presumption against implied
repeal to section 2(b), it is clear that the Gun Lake Act did not
repeal the APA waiver of sovereign immunity, as Justice Ginsburg
argues.296
In sum, Patchak v. Zinke highlights one recent example of
congressional case snatching. Specifically, the Supreme Court
sustained a federal law that provided a rule of decision in a specific
case involving land owned by a Native American tribe operating a
casino—a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
B. Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group:
“Now You See It, Now You Don’t”—Vesting Merely Contingent
Adjudicatory Authority to Hear and Decide Cases in the 
Article III Courts
Another recent example of congressional case snatching upheld
by the Supreme Court occurred in Oil States Energy, which is
discussed in greater detail in this Subsection.
292. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 289, at 327. In THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, Alexander
Hamilton compared a conflict with an earlier statute with a conflict of the Constitution when
he said:
The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining [conflicting statutes’]
relative validity is that the last in order of time shall be preferred to the first.
But this is a mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive law but
from the nature and reason of the thing.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 468.
293. See 5 U.S.C. § 702; Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 903 (2018) (plurality opinion).
294. § 702 (emphasis added).
295. Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014).
296. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 912-13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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1. OSE and the Problem of Advisory Opinions
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act establishes a process
called “inter partes review” of already-issued patents.297 Under inter
partes review, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), a non-Article III tribunal, has the authority to review a
patent decision made by a federal court.298 Essentially, inter partes
review allows the USPTO to reconsider and to cancel an issued
patent claim in limited circumstances.299 Oil States Energy (OSE)
litigated the case by arguing that patent validity claims must be
determined by the federal courts, not the USPTO.300 The precise
question presented was whether patent validity questions present
legal claims that are at the core of the “judicial Power of the United
States”301 or, instead, constitute “public rights” that Congress may
vest in non-Article III tribunals.302 However, a more problematic
separation of powers issue embedded in inter partes review, but an
issue not litigated or decided in Oil States Energy, was whether the
USPTO’s inter partes review violates Article III of the Constitution
by effectively rendering Article III courts’ proceedings and judg-
ments advisory in nature.
The patent statutes vest the USPTO with responsibility “for the
granting and issuing of patents.”303 An inventor will normally seek
a patent from the USPTO, which the agency either approves or
rejects.304 Both an approved patent and a rejected patent application
are subject to judicial review by an Article III court.305 However, the
Article III court’s decision is not final, because “a person who is not
the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute
an inter partes review.”306 After certain procedural requirements
297. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 311.
298. Id.
299. Id. §§ 311-319.
300. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372
(2018).
301. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
302. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986); N.
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70 (1982) (plurality opinion).
303. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1).
304. Id. §§ 112-131.
305. Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1372.
306. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a).
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have been met,307 the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board), an
adjudicatory body within the USPTO, reexamines the validity of the
patent incident to the inter partes review.308
The Board sits in “three-member panels of administrative patent
judges.”309 After the proceedings conclude, the Board will issue a
final written decision that determines the patent’s validity.310 If any
party is dissatisfied with the Board’s decision regarding the patent’s
validity, then the party can seek judicial review of the Board’s
decision with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.311 It bears noting that the statute permits a party to seek
this second look at any time.312
OSE, an oilfield services company, “obtained a patent relating to
an apparatus and method for protecting wellhead equipment used
in hydraulic fracturing” in 2001.313 OSE subsequently initiated an
action against Greene’s Energy Group (GEG) for infringing on that
patent in 2012.314 This led GEG to challenge the validity of OSE’s
patent in federal district court.315 Toward the end of the discovery
process, GEG sought inter partes review by the Board regarding the
OSE patent’s validity.316
Both the action in the federal district court and the inter partes
review by the Board proceeded in parallel.317 First, the district court
issued a claim-construction order in June 2014, which interpreted
the claim in a way so as to prevent GEG from raising claims
regarding the prior art.318 Shortly after, the Board issued its
307. Id. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted
unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under
section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged
in the petition.”).
308. Id. § 6; see id. § 316(c).
309. Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1371.
310. See 35 U.S.C. § 318(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2015).
311. See 35 U.S.C. § 319.
312. See generally Stephen Yelderman, Prior Art in Inter Partes Review, 104 IOWA L. REV.
2705, 2707-10, 2714-15, 2720-21, 2730-34 (2019) (providing an in-depth analysis, overview,
and explanation of the costs and benefits of the inter partes review process).
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decision, where it “acknowledged the District Court’s contrary
decision, but nonetheless concluded that the claims were anticipated
by the prior art.”319
Ultimately, the district court and the Board reached conflicting
legal conclusions: the Board found that OSE’s original claims were
unpatentable and the district court reached the opposite conclu-
sion.320 As a result, OSE sought review in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.321 OSE’s position was that the
Board’s inter partes review violates Article III because patent rev-
ocation must be tried before an Article III court rather than before
an administrative agency.322 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision.323 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted review in order to resolve whether the inter
partes review process violated Article III.324
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held that “[i]nter partes
review falls squarely within the public-rights doctrine” and
therefore claims of this sort could be litigated before the USPTO
without violating the separation of powers doctrine.325 He explained






324. Id. Here, in Oil States Energy, as in Patchak, Justice Clarence Thomas authored the
lead opinion, but this time a majority of the Justices joined his opinion. Id. at 1369 (Justices
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Thomas’s opinion for
the Court). Justice Stephen Breyer filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor. Id. at 1379 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting
opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts. Id. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The majority
squarely rejected OSE’s claim that Congress could not constitutionally vest the USPTO with
final authority to determine patent validity claims. See id. at 1372-73.
325. Id. at 1373. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion analyzed the inter partes review issue
under the “public-rights doctrine.” Id. Essentially, the public rights doctrine stands for the
proposition that private rights must be adjudicated by Article III courts, whereas adjudication
of matters “arising between the government and others, which from their nature do not
require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it.” Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S.
438, 451 (1929). Thus, the public rights doctrine “give[s] Congress significant latitude to
assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Article III courts.” Oil States Energy
Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1373; see Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 488-92 (2011) (discussing the
public rights doctrine exception to the Article III requirement that the judicial power to hear
and decide cases be vested exclusively in the federal courts rather than in non-Article III
tribunals).
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rights—specifically, the grant of a public franchise.”326 Justice
Thomas reasoned from this starting point that “[i]nter partes review
is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has
permissibly reserved the [US]PTO’s authority to conduct that
reconsideration.”327 In sum, inter partes review in the USPTO does
not unconstitutionally infringe on the authority of Article III courts
to decide patent validity claims.328
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the principal dissent, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts.329 Gorsuch took issue with the majority’s view
that inter partes review involves public rights rather than claims
arising at law330—a point that implicates the separation of powers
and raises case-snatching concerns associated with the conflict
between the reasoning and outcome in Stern and Schor.331 However,
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent did not address how allowing inter partes
review after judicial proceedings have commenced renders those
judicial proceedings essentially advisory in nature.
Indeed, none of the opinions in Oil States Energy engage arguably
the most serious problem with the inter partes review scheme:
namely, making the decisions of Article III courts, and all the
proceedings used to generate such decisions, merely advisory.
Typically to be justiciable, the court must not be offering an
advisory opinion. One of the earliest confrontations with justiciabili-
ty was in Hayburn’s Case.332 The Invalid Pensions Act of 1792
tasked federal circuit courts with initially determining the eligibility
of applicants for veteran’s benefits.333 After calculating an appli-
cant’s benefits, the Secretary of War would review and either accept
or reject the ruling of the Article III court on the applicant’s claim.334
326. Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1373 (observing that “[t]his Court has not
‘definitively explained’ the distinction between public and private rights” and positing that
the Court’s “precedents applying the public-rights doctrine have ‘not been entirely consistent’”
(first quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982); and
then quoting Stern, 564 U.S. at 488)).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
330. See id. at 1381.
331. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 483-85; Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 851-52, 856-57 (1986).
332. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409-11 (1792).
333. See Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243 (1792).
334. Id.
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Although the Supreme Court never issued a merits ruling on the
validity of this administrative structure, a majority of the Justices,
riding circuit, did consider the question and held that permitting an
executive branch official to review a final judgment of an Article III
court violated the separation of powers doctrine.335
A year later, in 1793, the Washington Administration sought the
Supreme Court’s views on the meaning of a treaty between the
United States and Great Britain.336 Chief Justice John Jay referred
a letter from Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to the full court
for its consideration.337 Speaking for the full Court, Chief Justice
Jay explained that “[t]he lines of separation drawn by the Constitu-
tion between the three departments of the government” precluded
the Supreme Court from offering merely advisory opinions.338
Similar to Hayburn’s Case, the Correspondence of the Justices con-
stitutes a landmark precedent against the Supreme Court issuing
advisory opinions.339 The USPTO’s ability to assert jurisdiction over
the validity of a patent, even while litigation over that question is
pending in the Article III courts, arguably creates a very similar, if
not quite identical, separation of powers problem because it has the
335. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410. The Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania (consisting of Wilson and Blair, Justices, and Peters, district judge) made the
following representation regarding the constitutionality of the Invalid Pensions Act: “[T]his
act is not of a judicial nature. It forms no part of the power vested by the Constitution in the
courts of the United States.” Id. at 411; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
218-19 (1995) (opining that Hayburn’s Case limits the Article III courts to hearing and
deciding “cases and controversies” and precludes the federal courts from issuing advisory
opinions).
336. See Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP.
CT. REV. 123, 144-58 (discussing the request by President Washington for “advice” from the
Supreme Court on foreign policy questions as well as the reasons the Justices provided for
declining to provide the requested legal advice); see also William R. Casto, The Early Supreme
Court Justices’ Most Significant Opinion, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 173, 181 (2002) (explaining
that President Washington’s cabinet disagreed over the answers to the foreign policy
questions and that Washington turned to the Supreme Court seeking an authoritative
interpretation of the treaty).
337. FALLON ET AL., supra note 236, at 52.
338. Id. (reprinting August 8, 1793, letter from Chief Justice Jay to President Washington).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 726 n.17 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the rule against federal courts issuing advisory opinions); see also
Joseph W. Mead, Interagency Litigation and Article III, 47 GA. L. REV. 1217, 1231-39 (2013)
(providing an analysis of litigation between two departments of the United States government
and discussing the judiciary’s earliest confrontations with justiciability and advisory
opinions).
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effect of rendering advisory both federal court proceedings and even
final judgments on patentability.
2. Proposed Solutions to OSE’s Advisory Opinion
Problem—Primary Jurisdiction and Certification
Critical for separation of powers purposes, renormalizing the
inter partes review process to more closely resemble the process
used when invoking either the primary jurisdiction doctrine or the
certification process would ensure that if a case leaves the federal
courts for an administrative agency (such as the USPTO), the
change of venue occurs because an Article III court, not a nervous
litigant, orders it. The problem of rendering federal court proceed-
ings advisory—because of the potential transfer back to the USPTO
for inter partes review—could best be addressed under the rubric of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion “is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the
courts and administrative agencies charged with particular
regulatory duties.”340 It applies when “a claim is originally cogniza-
ble in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body.”341 The Supreme Court has held that “[n]o
fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion.”342
Professor Kent Barnett explains that “[p]rimary jurisdiction, in
its most usual form, is a discretionary doctrine similar to absten-
tion, where courts can stay litigation to permit an agency to choose
to decide an issue first.”343 He observes that although no fixed rules
exist governing the doctrine’s use, “courts typically consider the
relevance of agency expertise and the need for uniformity” when
deciding whether or not to invoke it.344 The doctrine, in his view, can
340. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303 (1976) (quoting United States v.
W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956)).
341. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64.
342. Id.
343. Kent Barnett, Towards Optimal Enforcement, 72 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 127, 131
(2019).
344. Id. (footnote omitted). For a comprehensive and careful overview of when the Supreme
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“promote judicial efficiency and provide a mechanism for limiting
the number of private suits.”345 On the other hand, however,
Professor Diana Winters offers a more cautionary note, emphasizing
that the doctrine, outside the context of rate-making and labor
cases, “results in delay” and also “has the potential to interfere with
agency decisionmaking.”346
The development of the doctrine stems from a 1907 case, Texas &
Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.347 Texas & Pacific
presented the question whether an Article III court could review an
oil company’s claim that it was charged an unreasonable rate
because the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had the sole
responsibility for reviewing whether shipping rates were reason-
able.348 The Supreme Court held that allowing Article III courts and
the ICC to hear complaints on the exact same subject could lead to
conflicting, and irreconcilable, results.349 To avoid this conundrum,
the Supreme Court emphasized “the desirable uniformity which
would obtain if initially a specialized agency passed on certain types
of administrative questions.”350 However, later cases identified
Court and lower federal courts will apply the doctrine, and the specific legal tests that govern
its use in the lower federal appellate courts, see Diana R. H. Winters, Restoring the Primary
Jurisdiction Doctrine, 78 OHIO STATE L.J. 541, 549-51, 569-71 (2017).
345. Barnett, supra note 343, at 132.
346. Winters, supra note 344, at 591-92 (explaining that, on a best case basis, referral of
a question to an administrative agency will significantly delay resolution and warns that
“[l]engthy delays are inevitable as litigants approach the relevant agency, request a
determination, and then reapproach the court in the event of a decision or the failure of the
agency to consider the question”); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Primary Jurisdiction:
Another Victim of Reality, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 436 (2017) (“Invocation of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine has one major disadvantage: it has the potential to delay resolution of
the dispute before the court.”). Winters identifies a second concern as well: “the potential for
the interference with agency resource allocation and decisionmaking” because referral of a
legal question to a federal agency “asks the agency to prioritize that specific issue at that
time.” Winters, supra note 344, at 593-94. Professor Pierce reports that the federal courts
“have become reluctant to invoke primary jurisdiction” because of the risk of delay, as well
as from concerns related to “decreases in agency resources” and “judicial recognition that
courts cannot force agencies to reallocate their scarce resources” to answer the referring
court’s query on a timely basis. See Pierce, supra, at 436-37.
347. See 204 U.S. 426 (1907); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV.L.REV.
1037, 1042 (1964).
348. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 204 U.S. at 448.
349. Id. at 440-41.
350. United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956) (citing Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co.,
204 U.S. 426).
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specialization, expertise, and the knowledge that federal adminis-
trative agencies possess as additional, important rationales for the
primary jurisdiction doctrine.351
The doctrine gives the federal courts the discretion to refer a legal
question to an administrative agency so that the expert agency may
first decide the legal question at issue.352 This approach conserves
scarce judicial resources and also precludes the possibility of
proceedings in Article III courts being rendered essentially advisory
in nature. Thus, if an expert agency can best resolve a legal
question, the primary jurisdiction doctrine permits a federal court
to allow it to decide the issue.353 Moreover, the application of the
doctrine rests entirely with the Article III courts; a federal court
always has discretion to refer, or refrain from referring, a question
as it thinks best.354
The federal courts decide whether to apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis when “the reasons for
the existence of the doctrine are present and ... the purposes it
serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation.”355
When Article III courts find that an initial determination by an
agency would secure “[u]niformity and consistency in the regulation
351. Id.; see also Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993) (highlighting that the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is “specifically applicable to claims properly cognizable in court that
contain some issue within the special competence of an administrative agency”).
352. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64.
353. Winters, supra note 344, at 542-45, 552-73 (discussing how the primary jurisdiction
doctrine has become a tool that permits courts to stay or dismiss a case while seeking agency
advice on a particular issue within the agency’s purview, while still retaining jurisdiction over
the case and analyzing the doctrine’s application in the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts).
354. See id. at 547-48.
355. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64 (“[N]ow firmly established [is the principle], that in
cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring
the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the
subject matter should not be passed over.” (quoting Far E. Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S.
570, 574-75 (1952))). Moreover,
[u]niformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a
particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the
judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining
and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are
better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through
experience, and by more flexible procedure.
Id. at 64-65 (quoting Far E. Conf., 342 U.S. at 574-75).
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of business entrusted to a particular agency,”356 the doctrine should
apply. A second reason the Article III court will invoke the doctrine
is “the expert and specialized knowledge of the agencies involved”
would be instrumental in resolving the question correctly.357
From a procedural standpoint, the application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine is clear and simple. First, a court must “enable
a ‘referral’ to the agency, staying further proceedings so as to give
the parties reasonable opportunity to seek an administrative
ruling.”358 This means that referral of a particular issue to an agency
“does not deprive the court of jurisdiction; it has discretion either to
retain jurisdiction or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvan-
taged, to dismiss the case without prejudice.”359 Thus, the federal
court, not the agency, remains in control of the litigation.
The federal courts have not yet applied the primary jurisdiction
doctrine to the USPTO’s inter partes review process.360 Because
there is no “fixed formula” for when the doctrine applies, the
doctrine could apply when patent validity claims are eligible for
inter partes review. This flexibility should prompt Article III courts
to apply the doctrine by referring patent validity issues to the
USPTO—which would have the salutary effect of avoiding a
problematic form of congressional case snatching. Oil States Energy
did not reach these questions.361 In consequence, conflicting
judgments between Article III courts and the USPTO will poten-
tially arise regarding issues of patent validity. Currently, litigants
can pursue patent validity claims both in the Article III courts and
before the USPTO through the inter partes review process—a
circumstance that raises a serious separation of powers problem and
makes little (if any) sense as a matter of policy or efficiency.362
356. Far E. Conf., 342 U.S. at 574.
357. See W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64.
358. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993) (first citing W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at
63-64; then citing Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 291, 302 (1973); and then citing
Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 65, 68
(1970)).
359. Id. at 268-69.
360. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference
for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1971 (2013).
361. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379
(2018).
362. See id. at 1372.
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More troubling is that if a disgruntled litigant, such as GEG,
does not like its chances in the Article III forum where a patent
validity claim defense is pending, that litigant can press the “ejector
button” to escape federal court.363 The disgruntled litigant can
instead pursue its claim in the alternative USPTO administrative
forum and hope for a better outcome.364 This precise strategy
worked, and worked quite well, for GEG.365 GEG pursued challenges
to the OSE patent’s validity in the federal district court and
somewhat later concurrently through inter partes review within the
USPTO.366 Ultimately, the Article III courts and the USPTO reached
different legal conclusions.367 Of course, the Supreme Court
ultimately ruled in favor of GEG.368 The inter partes review process
nevertheless wasted scarce judicial resources and rendered the
proceedings in the district court essentially advisory in nature.369
Had the federal court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
to inter partes review, referral to the USPTO would constitute a
procedurally straightforward way to prevent this wasted judicial
effort.370 First, the doctrine would enable Article III courts to “refer”
patent validity cases, like OSE’s, to the USPTO. Practical reasons
that exist for referring patent validity issues to the USPTO include
the desirability for uniform and consistent judgments and the
specialized or expert knowledge of the USPTO.371 These reasons






368. Id. at 1379.
369. Cf. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 413-14 n.4 (1792) (noting lower court
decisions, rendered by members of the Supreme Court riding circuit, holding that Congress
may not make final judgments of the Article III courts subject to review by the Secretary of
War because such a procedure renders the judicial decision subject to such review within the
Executive Branch advisory in nature); FALLON ET AL., supra note 236, at 52 (reporting the
refusal of the Supreme Court to render an advisory opinion to the George Washington
administration regarding the correct interpretation of a treaty because federal courts may
hear and decide only actual “cases and controversies”).
370. See Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1372.
371. United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64-65 (1956) (quoting Far E. Conf. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952)).
372. Id.; see Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303-04 (1976); Far E. Conf.,
342 U.S. at 574-75.
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Taking this approach also would advance larger, and quite impor-
tant, constitutional values associated with the separation of powers
doctrine.
Notably, application of primary jurisdiction to the inter partes
review process would ensure that the Article III courts’ proceedings
and decisions would not be rendered advisory. As noted previously,
the Article III courts cannot render advisory opinions—and this rule
dates back to 1792 and Hayburn’s Case.373 In Hayburn’s Case, three
circuit courts, headed by Justices Wilson,374 Jay,375 and Iredell,376
advised President George Washington in separate opinion letters
that the Invalid Pensions Act of 1792377 violated the separation of
powers by making final judgments of the Article III courts review-
able by an executive branch official (the Secretary of War), thus
rendering these judgments advisory in character.378 Similarly, the
Supreme Court declined to offer the Washington Administration
advice on how to interpret and apply a treaty.379 Chief Justice Jay,
on behalf of the entire Supreme Court, told Secretary of State
373. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 413-14.
374. Id. at 411-12 (reprinting the opinion letter of Justice Wilson, Justice Blair, and
District Judge Peters regarding the validity of the statute). See generally 1 THE WORKS OF
JAMESWILSON 2 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (discussing Wilson’s contributions to the
concepts of separation of powers, the authority of the judiciary to review acts of the other
branches, and the development of principles of representative government).
375. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 (reprinting the opinion letter of Chief Justice
Jay, Justice Cushing, and District Judge Duane). See generally 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 5-7 (Maeva Marcus & James
R. Perry eds., 1985) (discussing Chief Justice Jay’s contributions during the early days of the
Supreme Court to the meaning of the separation of powers when the Court considered
questions central to creating a workable national government).
376. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 412-13 (reprinting the opinion letter of Justice
Iredell and District Judge Sitgreaves). See generally 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
375, at 62-63 (discussing the contributions of Justice Iredell during the early days of the
Supreme Court to the meaning of the separation of powers).
377. Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243 (1792).
378. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409; see also Pushaw, supra note 127, at 438-44
(discussing the early precedents of Hayburn’s Case and the Correspondence of the Justices
regarding judicial review, the finality of the judgments of Article III courts, and the
proscription against offering advisory opinions).
379. See Wheeler, supra note 336, at 144-58 (discussing the request by President
Washington for “advice” from the Supreme Court on foreign policy questions as well as the
reasons provided by the Justices for declining to provide advice).
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Thomas Jefferson that offering such advice would constitute an
impermissible advisory opinion.380
However, when a federal court chooses to stay proceedings and
refer a legal question to an administrative agency, no separation of
powers problem arises.381 Consistent with this approach, when a
question of patent validity arises, a federal district court could
entertain a motion to transfer the case to the USPTO for inter
partes review.382 Absent the Article III court’s consent, however,
transfer would not take place; the court, not the litigants, would
control the transfer process. When a district court transfers a case,
the action would be stayed while the USPTO considers the matter
and renders its judgment on reconsideration.383 If the USPTO
concludes that the patent is valid, then that ruling would be binding
on the parties as well as the court.384 The key is that the decision to
transfer the case back to the USPTO must rest with the Article III
court and not with the litigants.385 Additionally, the application of
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would “provid[e] patentees a
higher degree of certainty that at least on the basis of already raised
prior art, the patent is safe from being invalidated.”386 Of course, if
both parties prefer an Article III forum, presumably they could
agree to waive inter partes review and the district court would
proceed to determine the patent validity question.
380. Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug.
8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488-89 (Henry P.
Johnston ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890).
381. Christopher Ilardi, Note, The Broken System of Parallel Patent Proceedings: How to
Create a Unified, One-Judgment System, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2213, 2238 (2015).
382. Id. at 2241-45.
383. Id. at 2238.
384. See id. at 2243. Presumably GEG or OSE could raise procedural objections to the
USPTO’s reconsideration of the patent in the federal court proceeding. So too could a
constitutional claim related to the USPTO’s proceedings be heard and decided by the federal
courts. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-05 (1988) (holding that the federal courts
presumptively may hear and decide constitutional claims related to agency action and stating
grave doubts about whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit the federal courts from
hearing and deciding such constitutional claims on the merits).
385. Ilardi, supra note 381, at 2242-43 (describing how cases would be transferred to the
USPTO if the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applied); cf. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889,
892 (2001) (describing the harms that come from allowing patent litigants to pick and choose
between forums).
386. Ilardi, supra note 381, at 2243.
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The certification procedure in pure diversity cases is quite
analogous to the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion—and accordingly provides a second example of a constitution-
ally permissible means of transferring (at least in part) pending
litigation from the Article III courts to a non-Article III forum (in
this instance to state supreme courts). Certification involves the
federal courts (either district courts or circuit courts) referring un-
decided, but controlling, questions of state law to a state supreme
court to answer.387 Professor Jonathan Nash explains that when
“certification is an available option, one or more of the parties to the
federal case may request that the federal court invoke certification,
or the federal court may choose that option sua sponte.”388 The local
federal district or circuit court rules must authorize the practice;
however, most local rules provide for certification if a state supreme
387. This is assuming that certification is an option. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining
the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1690
n.74 (2003) (“As a threshold matter, certification of a question of state law will be an available
option to a federal court only if the state whose law is at issue offers a certification procedure
for the federal court to exercise. A federal court will not ask a state high court to respond to
any questions of state law if there is no procedure under state law that authorizes
certification.”). Nash observes that “[a] more difficult question is whether federal courts might
have the power to certify questions in the absence of a state certification procedure.” Id. at
1690-91 n.74; see Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress’s
Power to Direct State Judicial Action: Congress’s Power to Compel State Courts to Answer
Certified Questions of State Law, 31 CONN. L. REV. 649, 649 (1999) (discussing whether
Congress has the power to allow federal courts to order state courts to answer undecided
questions of state law even if they would prefer not to do so).
388. Nash, supra note 387, at 1690-92 (footnote omitted) (discussing local federal appellate
rules that authorize parties to move for certification and federal courts to certify questions of
state law to the appropriate state supreme court); see, e.g., 7th Cir. R. 52 (permitting the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to certify undecided questions of state law to a state
supreme court on motion of a party); see also In re Badger Lines, Inc., 140 F.3d 691, 698-99
(7th Cir. 1998) (certifying an undecided question of state law on a party’s motion to a state
supreme court). See generally James A. Parker, Daniel A. McKinnon & Ted Occhialino,
Certification and Removal: Practices and Procedures, 31 N.M. L. REV. 161, 170 (2001) (noting
that, from 1990 to 1994, “[o]nly thirty percent of the requests by counsel to certify a question
to a state court have been honored by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals; seventy percent of
the time they turn down the request to certify” and observing that this represents “the highest
rate of refusals by a circuit court in the United States”). On the other hand, however, data
exist that suggest other federal appellate courts might be less reticent to approve motions for
certification than the Tenth Circuit. See id. (“Some refuse only about fifteen percent of the
time.”).
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court has agreed to receive and decide certified questions of state
law from the federal courts.389
For present purposes, the key point is that although a party to a
pending federal court diversity case may move for certification of a
controlling, but undecided, legal question to a state supreme court,
the decision to seek the state supreme court’s input—effectively to
transfer the case in part from the federal court to the state supreme
court for purposes of resolving a central legal issue—remains
entirely vested with the Article III court (not the parties).390 This is
a crucial difference between certification and inter partes review
before the USPTO, which involves the parties, not the federal court
hearing a patent dispute, controlling whether to transfer the case
back to the administrative agency.391 With the certification process
in a diversity case, the federal court has the final say as to whether
or not to invoke certification.392
Of course, asking a state supreme court to answer an undecided
question of state law does not necessarily mean that the state
supreme court will agree to cooperate. As Professor Nash explains,
“A state high court has discretion to accept or reject the certifying
court’s questions.”393 After a state high court accepts the certifica-
tion from the federal court, it will proceed to resolve the certified
questions of undecided state law.394 A state supreme court’s
389. See, e.g., 7th Cir. R. 52 (permitting the court to certify questions of state law to a state
high court sua sponte); see also Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 662 (1978) (featuring the
Supreme Court certifying sua sponte, and on its own motion, an undecided but controlling
question of state law).
390. The federal court transmits the certificate, which is directed to the judges of the state
supreme court. See Wilson v. Bryan (In re Wilson), 162 F.3d 378, 378 (5th Cir. 1998)
(addressing a certification request to the Justices of the Supreme Court of Louisiana).
391. See supra notes 313-40 and accompanying text.
392. See, e.g., Barnes v. Atl. & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 514 F.2d 704, 705 n.4 (5th Cir.
1975).
393. Nash, supra note 387, at 1693; see also Schlieter v. Carlos, 775 P.2d 709, 710 (N.M.
1989) (“[W]e may undertake at our discretion to answer [certified] questions when the
answers are ‘determinative’ of the cause before the federal court.”); Tunick v. Safir, 731
N.E.2d 597, 598-99 (N.Y. 2000) (declining to answer questions certified by the Second Circuit).
394. Nash, supra note 387, at 1693-94 (“State courts considering certified questions do not
engage in fact finding. Certification applies only to questions of law; thus, state courts have
treated the collection by the certifying federal court of all necessary ancillary factual findings
as a prerequisite to proper certification.”); see Sangamo Weston, Inc. v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 414
S.E.2d 127, 130 (S.C. 1992) (holding that the court would not accept and answer a certified
question of South Carolina state law because the factual record was not developed sufficiently
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involvement will end after it has provided the answers to the federal
court’s certified questions.395
The federal courts were initially uncertain if a state high court’s
answers to the certified questions were binding on the certified
court. However, “modern federal courts generally agree that they
are bound to follow state court responses to certified questions.”396
This approach, at least potentially, avoids the problem of an opinion
from a state supreme court being merely advisory in nature.
Although some state supreme courts enjoy express constitutional
authority to issue advisory opinions,397 state constitutions typically
restrict who may seek one—the provisions often authorize the
governor, the state legislature, or the state attorney general to
request an advisory opinion.398 Because answers to certified
questions are binding on the federal court seeking those answers,
and because the federal courts cannot hear and decide disputes
and the court would “not issue advisory opinions and cannot alter precedent based on
questions presented in the abstract”).
395. See John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law,
41 VAND. L. REV. 411, 419 (1988) (“When a certified question is answered and returned to the
certifying court, ... the state high court’s influence over the case is effectively ended.”).
396. Nash, supra note 387, at 1695; see also Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Tr. Co.,
567 F.2d 268, 269 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that the Maryland state high court’s answer to a
certified question of Maryland law was “definitive” and binding on the federal courts); Coastal
Petroleum Co. v. Sec’y of Army of U.S., 489 F.2d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the
Florida Supreme Court’s answer to a certified question of Florida law constitutes “the last
word” on the law of that state and has a binding effect on the federal courts in a diversity
case); Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Idaho 1983)
(observing that when it answers certified questions from a federal court, the Idaho Supreme
Court expects its answers to those certified questions will be determinative of the law of Idaho
in any and all subsequent proceedings).
397. Lucas Moench, Note, State Court Advisory Opinions: Implications for Legislative
Power and Prerogatives, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2243, 2246 (2017) (“[S]tatutory or constitutional
provisions in Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Dakota allow their highest courts to issue
advisory opinions in some circumstances.”); see, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. II (“Each
branch of the legislature, as well as the governor or the council, shall have authority to
require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions
of law, and upon solemn occasions.”).
398. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“The judges of the supreme court shall give their
written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested by the governor or by either
house of the general assembly.”); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (“The attorney general shall, as
directed by general law, request the opinion of the justices of the supreme court as to the
validity of any initiative petition circulated pursuant to Section 3 of Article XI.”); see also
Moench, supra note 397, at 2255.
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absent a concrete case or controversy,399 no issues generally arise
from a state supreme court that either cannot issue advisory
opinions at all or can issue advisory opinions only in response to
queries from specific state government officials or institutions.400
Lehman Brothers v. Schein provides a useful example of how the
certification process works.401 In this litigation, the plaintiff class
brought a shareholders’ derivative action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York based upon a
theory of misappropriation of information by a corporate insider.402
The New York state courts had previously endorsed a theory of
liability based on the misappropriation of information by someone
in a corporation’s management.403 However, the Florida courts,
whose laws governed the dispute under the applicable choice-of-law
clauses, had not yet ruled on whether a misappropriation theory of
liability was viable under Florida state corporations law.404
The district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reached opposite conclusions as to the correct result under
Florida law.405 In order to resolve this conflict between the trial and
appellate courts on this outcome-determinative question, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari solely to consider whether “the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit err[ed] in not certifying the
question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to
Florida’s certification procedure.”406 The Supreme Court observed
that certification was “particularly appropriate in view of the
399. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
400. See Grover ex rel. Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718-19 (6th Cir. 1994)
(chiding the district court for having “ignored the binding effect of the Ohio Supreme Court’s
majority opinion” and explaining that “[a] federal court that certifies a question of state law
should not be free to treat the answer as merely advisory unless the state court specifically
contemplates that result”).
401. See 416 U.S. 386 (1974). The U.S. Supreme Court gave its express approval to the
invocation of certification in pure diversity cases because “[i]t does, of course, in the long run
save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism.” Id. at 391.
402. Id. at 387-88.
403. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 914-16 (N.Y. 1969).
404. See Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 388.
405. The Southern District of New York ruled that Florida law did not support a
misappropriation theory. See Gildenhorn v. Lum’s Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329, 333-34 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), rev’d sub nom. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom. Lehman
Bros., 416 U.S. 386. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that Florida
law did support a misappropriation theory of liability. See Schein, 478 F.2d at 821-23.
406. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 414 U.S. 1062, 1062 (1973).
2021] AGAINST CONGRESSIONAL CASE SNATCHING 857
novelty of the question and the great unsettlement of Florida law”
and then remanded the case, admonishing the Second Circuit to
consider carefully whether it should certify the controlling state law
question to the Florida Supreme Court.407 What is more, on remand,
this is precisely what the Second Circuit proceeded to do.408
Lehman Brothers thus provides a highly salient example of the
potential benefits of the certification procedure to a well-functioning
judicial system.409 First, it allows “a state government to establish
and define its own state law” and “gives the state judiciary the
opportunity to rule on important issues of state law in cases in
which it might not otherwise have had the chance.”410 Second,
certification allows a state high court to rule on undecided questions
of state law, which spares federal courts the difficult task of
determining state law.411 These reasons are largely the same as for
the invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine because state
high courts should have interpretative primacy over questions of
state law.412
407. Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 391-92.
408. Schein v. Chasen, 519 F.2d 453, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1975); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d
739, 747 (Fla. 1975) (answering the questions certified). Ultimately, the Second Circuit
affirmed the judgment below because the Florida Supreme Court’s answer to the questions
certified disposed of the controversy originally before it. Schein, 519 F.2d at 454.
409. See also Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Lee Cnty. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 467 F.2d 447, 449 (5th
Cir. 1972) (“[Certification] ... minimiz[es] or eliminat[es] entirely the confusion, uncertainty
and juridical friction inherent in a system of Federalism that frequently forces Federal Judges
to assume—often with extreme reluctance—a decisional role that properly belongs to their
brethren on the State bench.”).
410. Nash, supra note 387, at 1697; see Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d
793, 798 n.9 (Tex. 1992).
411. See McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 158-59, 158 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi,
J., dissenting) (discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s difficulty in
interpreting state law); Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 302-03, 303 n.11
(3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting) (discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit’s difficulty in interpreting state law); United States v. Buras, 475 F.2d 1370, 1375 (5th
Cir. 1972) (Brown, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Our wide experience
with certification to the Florida Supreme Court has ... proved its utility in sparing this
Court—and more importantly, the litigants—the risk of a wrong decision.”); United Servs.
Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., concurring)
(describing occasions when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has attempted to
interpret state law, but nevertheless failed to resolve controlling questions of state law
correctly).
412. Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (“Respect for the independence
of state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the
cornerstones of this Court’s refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and
858 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:791
The certification procedure, like primary jurisdiction, permits a
federal court to seek an authoritative answer from the entity with
the most relevant expertise to answer the question; in theory, this
approach should lead to better law.413 As with agencies and primary
jurisdiction,414 it is better for federal courts to seek and obtain the
authoritative answer than to guess at it, especially when the state
high courts are free to disregard the answer rendered independently
by a federal court.415 Thus, certification guarantees federal court
litigants final resolution of their case based upon definite state law
as determined by the state’s high court.416
Ultimately, renormalizing the inter partes review process to more
closely resemble the process used when invoking either the primary
jurisdiction doctrine or the certification process would ensure that
if a case leaves the federal courts for an administrative agency (like
independent state ground.”).
413. See Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) (finding that certification
“increas[es] the assurance of gaining an authoritative response”).
414. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956). As with certification,
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction involves suspending the federal court proceedings and
awaiting an answer to the controlling question from the expert administrative agency. See id.
(holding that when a court has invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction “the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views”
(citing Gen. Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 433 (1940))); Pierce,
supra note 346, at 436 (positing that the primary jurisdiction doctrine advances several
important values, including “allow[ing] an issue to be resolved by an institution with superior
subject matter expertise,” securing “uniformity with respect to federal law,” and ensuring the
“coherent and efficient” implementation of federal regulatory programs).
415. See Wade H. McCree, Foreword, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 255, 262-63 (1977).
416. See Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question..., 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
677, 690 (1995). The same also holds true with respect to federal administrative agencies, like
the USPTO, under the Chevron doctrine. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981-85, 1002-03 (2005) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). An administrative agency is free to revise or reject
prior interpretations of ambiguous statutory texts—even after a federal court has reviewed
the prior interpretation and approved it. See id. at 982 (“A court’s prior judicial construction
of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the
statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”). Because an agency may lawfully
adopt any reasonable construction of an ambiguous statutory text, it would be far more
efficient to permit an agency to interpret, or even to reinterpret, an ambiguous statutory text
in the first instance than for a court to impose its own reading of the text on the agency (which
would not be bound by it). See id. at 982-86 (explaining that an agency is not bound by a
federal court decision accepting an earlier interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision
and remains free to choose any reasonable interpretation of the text going forward).
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the USPTO), the change of venue occurs because an Article III
court, not a disgruntled litigant, orders it, which is critical for
separation of powers purposes. Finally, it bears noting that this
approach would also make the inter partes review process more
closely resemble the rules and procedures governing the transfer of
cases to the Article I bankruptcy courts in bankruptcy proceedings.
As with the invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine and the
certification process, a non-Article III bankruptcy court may hear a
bankruptcy case only if a federal district court voluntarily transfers
the matter to the non-Article III tribunal.417
The 1984 Bankruptcy Act vests the district courts with jurisdic-
tion over bankruptcy cases, but permits them to delegate resolution
of these cases to Article I bankruptcy courts.418 In fact, after
Northern Pipeline, Congress used this device to avoid a serious
separation of powers problem.419 Under the revised procedures, a
district court may choose not to transfer a case or, if it elects to send
a case to the bankruptcy courts for resolution, to reassert jurisdic-
tion at any time after doing so.420 Thus, bankruptcy courts only hear
cases when a district court has authorized them to do so.421 Through
417. See Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015).
418. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)-(b)(1). For a discussion of the limits of bankruptcy court
authority, see N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58, 62, 84
(1982) (plurality opinion) (invalidating the adjudicative authority of a non-Article III tribunal
by holding that Article I bankruptcy courts could not constitutionally hear a state law breach
of contract claim because vesting authority over such claims violated the separation of powers
doctrine). Additionally, in Stern, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Northern Pipeline that
Congress may not assign non-congressionally created claims to non-Article III tribunals for
final judgment. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (holding that “Article III of
the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States may be vested only in
courts whose judges enjoy the protections set forth in that Article” and concluding that “[t]he
Bankruptcy Court below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a
state law counterclaim”).
419. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 862-65 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under Northern Pipeline, Congress could not grant the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission authority to hear common law claims incident to
the agency’s disposition of public rights claims arising under the agency’s enabling statute).
420. See Wellness Int’l Network, 135 S. Ct. at 1939.
421. See id.; see also Andrea Olson, Defining the Article III Judicial Power: Comparing
Congressional Power to Strip Jurisdiction with Congressional Power to Reassign
Adjudications, 53 CREIGHTON L. REV. 111, 123-25 (2019) (discussing the application of the
separation of powers doctrine to congressional schemes that transfer the adjudication of cases
to non-Article III tribunals).
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the vesting of transfer and supervisory authority, the district courts
retain control over the adjudication of bankruptcy cases.422
If Article III courts apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine to the
USPTO’s inter partes review process, the decision to transfer a case
to the USPTO would rest entirely in the discretion of the Article III
court rather than with the litigants. The Article III courts would
also retain ongoing supervisory authority and jurisdiction over any
and all transferred cases. In consequence, the separation of powers
problem that arises from parallel proceedings regarding the validity
of a patent would be avoided; the proceedings of the Article III
courts would no longer be merely advisory in nature because the
authority of the Article III courts to hear and decide patent validity
cases would not be merely contingent.423 However, as it stands, Oil
States Energy highlights another example of congressional case
snatching the Supreme Court sustained in upholding a federal law
that permits a nervous litigant to remove a pending case involving
a patent infringement claim from an Article III court—potentially
at any point in the judicial processing, including litigation pending
before the Court of Appeals or even the Supreme Court—back to the
USPTO.
422. See Wellness Int’l Network, 135 S. Ct. at 1944-46; Stern, 564 U.S. 462.
423. It bears noting that, as a general matter, the federal courts have been invoking the
primary jurisdiction doctrine with less frequency over time; Professor Richard Pierce observes
that “[j]udicial invocations of primary jurisdiction have become rare.” Pierce, supra note 346,
at 437; see also Barnett, supra note 343, at 133 (noting the federal “courts’ increasing
reluctance to use the doctrine”). Instead, “[c]ourts routinely ask agencies to submit amicus
briefs in which the agencies apprise courts of their interpretations of agency-administered
statutes, rules, and tariffs” and “[a]gencies typically respond promptly and affirmatively to
those requests.” Pierce, supra note 346, at 437. Pierce believes that “both the Supreme Court
and lower [federal] courts seem to accord agency interpretations adopted in amicus briefs the
same degree of deference they accord to interpretations adopted in adjudications and rules.”
Id. at 438. Nevertheless, the primary jurisdiction doctrine remains good law and the Supreme
Court has invoked the doctrine with some regularity over the past half-century. See Winters,
supra note 344, at 552-67 (collecting and analyzing Supreme Court decisions from 1956 to
2015 that addressed the potential application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine). Professor
Diana Winters found that, from 1956 to 2015, “there were about seventy-three Supreme Court
cases that considered whether the application of primary jurisdiction was warranted.” Id. at
552. Accordingly, we believe it would be entirely plausible to avoid the separation of powers
problem that the USPTO’s review otherwise presents by applying the primary jurisdiction
doctrine to vest control of the transfer decision with the federal court hearing the dispute.
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III. CONGRESSIONAL CASE SNATCHING CONSTITUTES A CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER TO THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND
INDEPENDENCE OF THE ARTICLE III COURTS
The great American poet Robert Frost once wrote that “[g]ood
fences make good neighbors.”424 The federal courts need to apply
this principle in a careful and consistent way when Congress at-
tempts to control the disposition of judicial business—or attempts
to vest the federal courts with only contingent authority to hear and
decide particular legal disputes. Even if “the modern administrative
state requires the abandonment of formalism in separation of
powers analyses, at least insofar as executive/legislative power-
sharing arrangements are concerned,” a fundamental difference
exists “between novel power-sharing arrangements between the two
political branches and attempts to include Article III judges in such
arrangements.”425 This is so because “[u]nlike the federal courts,
both the President and Congress have ample tools at their disposal
to prevent encroachments on their institutional prerogatives.”426
A. Enforcing the Separation of Powers Doctrine to Protect
Judicial Authority Would Not Prevent or Impede Legitimate
Congressional Policy Making
Embracing pragmatic formalism in separation of powers cases
involving the institutional independence of the Article III courts
would at most require relatively modest changes to the statutes at
424. Robert Frost, Mending Wall (1914), reprinted in THE TREASURY OF AMERICAN POETRY
342 (Nancy Sullivan ed., 1978). The full verse bears repeating:
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, “Good fences make good neighbors.”
Id. In point of fact, the Supreme Court has invoked Frost when, engaging in a formalist
analysis, it held that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to reopen final judgments
of the Article III courts. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995)
(“Separation of powers, a distinctively American political doctrine, profits from the advice
authored by a distinctively American poet: Good fences make good neighbors.”).
425. Krotoszynski, supra note 117, at 476.
426. Id. at 479; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 465-66 (describing the federal
judiciary as “the weakest of the three departments of power” and observing that the judiciary
“can never attack with success” the legislative or executive branches).
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issue in Patchak, Bank Markazi, and Oil States Energy. Indeed, the
statutes at issue in all three cases could be brought into compliance
with a more strictly formalist conception of the separation of powers
very easily.
In Patchak, had the Supreme Court found that section 2(b) of the
Gun Lake Act violated the Klein rule against Congress imposing a
rule of decision on a federal court currently adjudicating a legal
dispute and consequentially invalidated it, section 2(a) would likely
have led the district court to dismiss Patchak’s challenge to the
government’s decision to take the Bradley Property into trust.427 The
only difference—at most a nominal one—would be that the federal
courts, not Congress, would have parsed the meaning of section 2(a)
in order to reach that result.
We believe that in close cases, a prudent commitment to protect-
ing judicial authority and enforcing the separation of powers
doctrine should require the federal courts to resolve any lingering
doubts about whether a new statute possesses the requisite level of
generality against Congress; yet, to date, it would appear that a
working majority of the Justices has taken the exact opposite
approach (and resolved ambiguities in favor of sustaining congres-
sional enactments that appear to constitute case snatching). So too,
as we observed earlier, if the inter partes review process at issue in
Oil States Energy could be commenced only with the affirmative
approval of a federal district court (when that court is in the process
of deciding a patent infringement suit) the statutory procedure
would effectively be renormalized as little more than a routine
application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.428
The key to resolving the separation of powers difficulty is to make
the transfer of the question of a patent’s validity one for the Article
III court, rather than for a nervous litigant.429 The practical
difference in the availability of inter partes review would be de
minimis.430 Nevertheless, vesting the transfer decision in the Article
III court would mean that these legal questions would be fully,
427. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 911 (2018) (Breyer, J., concurring); supra notes
176-80 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 340-86 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 360-86 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 360-87 and accompanying text.
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rather than only contingently, entrusted to the Article III courts.431
The proceedings would no longer be effectively advisory in nature
(in violation of the rules announced in The Correspondence of the
Justices and Hayburn’s Case).432
Moreover, what harm would it have done to note, perhaps in a
footnote, that permitting a disgruntled litigant to force a transfer of
a legal question pending before an Article III court to an adminis-
trative agency raises serious separation of powers problems? The
Supreme Court routinely flags constitutional problems that parties
have failed to raise.433 It could—and should—have used this
technique in Oil States Energy.
The statute at issue in Bank Markazi admittedly presents a
harder question.434 The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012 made Iranian state central bank assets available
to a particular group of plaintiffs in a single judicial proceeding.435
At first blush, it is difficult to see how the federal courts could
render a saving construction of the statute.436 To generalize the law,
so as to make judgments capable of execution against any and all
state-operated central banks, would radically and unreasonably
expand the scope of the enactment.
A more modest judicial surgery on the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act would be to interpret the law as making
assets of the Bank Markazi available to satisfy any and all valid
legal judgments issued by a federal or state court. Of course, taking
this step would increase, quite substantially, the generality of the
431. See supra note 423 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 332-39, 373-80 and accompanying text.
433. See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emps., Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 n.12
(1983) (noting a potentially valid legal objection to a city jobs set-aside program for local
residents but declining to decide this question because “[t]his question has not been, to any
great extent, briefed or argued in this Court” and, accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded
the case “without passing on its merits” (citing Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co.,
304 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1938))). 
434. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1316 (2016).
435. 22 U.S.C. § 8772; see supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
436. See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1946-49 (1997)
(discussing the theory and practice of federal courts rewriting statutes via “saving
constructions” to avoid invalidating the statute); see also Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P.
Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV.L. REV.
2109, 2115-19 (2015) (discussing the same).
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statute.437 Even so, Congress could decide to accept a judicially
modified statute with a broader scope of application—to avoid a
Klein problem—or to repeal the statute in toto.438 Accordingly,
although a judicial fix to avoid a separation of powers problem
would require a bit more creativity in Bank Markazi, one could
envision a judicial gloss on the statute that would render the statute
a genuine “new law” rather than a command to decide a particular
set of cases in the fashion that Congress would prefer.439
Thus, in most, if not all, instances of attempted congressional case
snatching, no more than modest amendments of the constitutionally
problematic statutes would be necessary to avoid the separation of
powers problem. A pragmatic formalist application440 of the
separation of powers doctrine to protect the weakest branch from
congressional predation would not require Congress to significantly
modify its habits and practices.441 This legal fact constitutes one of
the central paradoxes of pragmatic formalism: in virtually all
instances, very small changes to Congress’s administrative innova-
tions would bring them within the metes and bounds of the
Madisonian system of the separation of powers.442
Accordingly, dire warnings from functionalist jurists, such as
Justice Stephen Breyer,443 do not really hold up to close scrutiny.
Simply put, pragmatic formalism in separation of powers analysis
will not cause serious or undue disruption to the administrative
state.444 Because the practical difficulty and cost of securing the
decisional authority and autonomy of the Article III courts can, in
most cases, be easily mitigated, arguments against embracing
pragmatic formalism are particularly weak and unconvincing.445
437. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
438. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 436, at 2120-21.
439. Id. at 2119.
440. See supra note 120.
441. See supra notes 427-28 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 427-39 and accompanying text.
443. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 520-21 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“these types of disputes arise in bankruptcy court with some frequency” and warning that “a
constitutionally required game of jurisdictional ping-pong between courts would lead to
inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless additional suffering among those faced with
bankruptcy”).
444. See supra notes 427-28 and accompanying text.
445. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 72, at 477-78 (dismissing several arguments against
formalism).
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B. Congressional Case Snatching Endangers Both the
Independence and the Authority of the Article III Courts
One could reasonably ask, “Why should we care if Congress
intervenes in a case and prescribes a rule of decision that dictates
a particular outcome in a pending case?” Does permitting Congress
to intervene legislatively to make specific assets available to satisfy
a judgment,446 to prevent challenges to an administrative agency’s
decision to hold land in trust for the benefit of a Native American
tribe who wished to operate a casino on the parcel,447 or to permit a
nervous litigant to remove a case from the Article III courts to an
administrative agency448 really present an existential threat to the
independence of the Article III courts? At the risk of sounding
unduly alarmist, we believe that the answer to this question is
clearly yes.
Considered individually and in isolation, the incursions that have
occurred to date on the institutional power and authority of the
federal courts might seem to be harmless—utterly picayune.
446. See, e.g., Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C.
§ 8772; see also Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1325-28 (2016) (upholding a
statute making assets of Iran’s national bank available to satisfy judgments for plaintiffs
involved in a single judicial proceeding because “a statute does not impinge on judicial power
when it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts” and “[t]his Court and
lower courts have upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’ legislative power diverse laws that
governed one or a very small number of specific subjects”).
447. Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2, 128 Stat. 1913
(2014); see also Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905-08 (2018) (upholding a rule-of-decision
statute that ordered the federal courts to interpret a statute in a particular way because it
“change[d] the law” by “strip[ping] federal courts of jurisdiction over actions” that pertained
to a particular parcel of land in Michigan). But cf. Jellum, supra note 61, at 869-70 (observing
that “[t]he line between dictating results and altering underlying policy can be difficult to
draw” but nevertheless concluding “[w]hen either the executive or legislature attempts to
decide cases, reopen final cases, or interfere with the decisionmaking process, separation of
powers is violated”).
448. See American Inventors Protection Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 312(a), 314(a); see also Oil
States Energy Servs. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp. LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018) (holding
that “inter partes review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment” and rejecting
OSE’s constitutional objections to involuntary de facto remands of patent infringement cases
to the USPTO). One should take care to note that OSE failed to argue in the lower federal
courts that permitting parties to effectively force a remand of a pending judicial question to
a federal administrative agency violates the separation of powers doctrine. See id. At least
arguably, this claim might have provided a stronger constitutional objection to this novel
adjudicatory structure that vested only contingent jurisdiction over patent infringement
claims with the Article III courts. See supra notes 332-93 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, permitting Congress to usurp the constitutional
authority of the federal courts in any fashion effectively opens the
door to larger scale incursions on the independence and autonomy
of the Article III courts.
Judge Irving Kaufman, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, has observed that “[t]he essence of judicial inde-
pendence [consists of] the preservation of a separate institution of
government that can adjudicate cases or controversies with impar-
tiality.”449 He argued, with some force, that maintaining the
independence of the federal courts requires that the federal courts
resist “all significant intrusions upon the exercise of the judicial
power.”450 Kaufman insisted that “the ultimate power of decision,
the judicial power of the United States, remain in the third
branch.”451
These considerations, if applied to statutes that impose a rule of
decision in a case sub judice in an Article III court, should require
that such a law be held unconstitutional on separation of powers
grounds.452 So too, a law that authorizes a disgruntled litigant to
short circuit pending judicial proceedings by effectively transferring
an outcome-determinative legal question pending before an Article
III court to a federal administrative agency, removes the “ultimate
power of decision” from the federal judiciary.453 In both instances,
the ultimate power of decision no longer rests with the federal
courts—it instead rests with Congress (in circumstances such as
those in Patchak and Bank Markazi) or with a federal administra-
tive agency (in circumstances such as those in Oil States Energy).
But precisely how far may Congress go without exceeding
constitutional limits on directing the federal courts? In City of
Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission, Justice Antonin
Scalia happily conceded that “Congress has the power (within
limits) to tell the courts what classes of cases they may decide.”454
However, this power to grant or withhold jurisdiction does not
449. Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM.L.REV. 671, 688
(1980).
450. Id.
451. Id. at 693.
452. See Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 919-22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
453. See Kaufman, supra note 449, at 693.
454. 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013).
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encompass the power “to prescribe or superintend how they decide
those cases.”455 Moreover, “[a] court’s power to decide a case is
independent of whether its decision is correct, which is why even an
erroneous judgment is entitled to res judicata effect”—which means
that “a jurisdictionally proper but substantively incorrect judicial
decision is not ultra vires.”456
Congress can and does possess broad discretion to regulate the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.457 We should not be understood to suggest
that Klein effectively overrules McCardle or that Klein should have
done so. Questions of degree, which Klein presented, necessarily will
entail hard cases with close facts. The core legal principle, however,
is easy to state (if not always easy to apply): Congress may not
usurp the power of a federal court to decide a pending case, even if
it has the legal authority to prevent future courts from hearing
similar cases going forward.
In sum, the point is a relatively straightforward one. Congress
may change the laws that the federal courts must apply to cases sub
judice, but Congress may not actually dictate how a federal court
must apply a rule in a pending case. Laws with broad general effect
will almost never constitute rule of decision violations, but laws that
apply to a single docket or litigant, by way of contrast, will almost
always violate the proscription against congressional case snatch-
ing.458 As the generality of a statute wanes, the separation of powers
problem waxes. If Congress wishes to avoid the potential for judicial





458. See, e.g., Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C.
§ 8772(b).
459. It would not be inappropriate for the Supreme Court to direct Congress to write more
general laws if it wishes to avoid the risk of judicial invalidation of laws on Klein grounds. The
Justices have not been shy, for example, in requiring Congress to indicate that a general
Commerce Clause statute is to apply to state governments as such. See Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991). So too, the Justices instructed state supreme courts to include
a plain statement indicating that a decision rests exclusively on state law grounds if it wishes
to insulate that decision from Supreme Court review. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1040-42 (1983). If it is permissible to require Congress and state supreme courts to adopt
plain statements in order to insulate their work from review and potential invalidation, it is
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Congress certainly possesses all of the legislative powers vested
in the federal government.460 However, Congress does not possess
any of the judicial power of the United States;461 the power to decide
cases and controversies that fall within the judicial power of the
United States must be vested in the Article III courts—and not
usurped by Congress or transferred to the Executive Branch.
Patchak, Oil States Energy, and Bank Markazi constitute unjusti-
fied, and quite lamentable, failures to observe this basic separation
of powers rule. Precisely because of the inherent structural weak-
ness of the federal courts, Hamilton’s “least dangerous” branch,462
the application and enforcement of separation of powers values
must be demanding rather than forgiving when Congress attempts
to reallocate the business of the Article III courts.
Moreover, if the level of generality seems questionable—such that
a reasonable interpreter might understand the statutory language
not to alter governing law, but to prescribe a rule of decision in a
pending case—the federal court should construe the ambiguity
against Congress. Good fences make for good neighbors—and fences
are most effective when they are kept in good repair. If Congress
wishes to change the governing law, it can always reenact a statute
that fell on the wrong side of the boundary and modify it to adopt a
less specific, more general policy. This also demonstrates that
adopting pragmatic formalism in enforcing the separation of judicial
and legislative authority would not unduly burden or constrain
Congress. If Congress genuinely wishes to establish a new law, and
a new regulatory policy, it can always win by simply legislating at
a reasonable level of generality. When a statute references a single
parcel of land, or a single civil case docket number, it beggars belief
and strains credulity to claim that Congress is really changing the
no less plausible to imagine a rule that instructs Congress to write laws that meet a minimum
level of generality to avoid invalidation on Klein grounds.
460. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”).
461. Id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”).
462. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 465.
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governing law rather than trying to directly usurp judicial authority
to hear and decide a pending case or controversy.
In this regard, Euripides’s admonition bears repeating: the best
way to avoid a bad ending is to avoid a bad beginning.463 To date,
unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not adopted this approach.
Even so, nothing would prevent the Justices from making a course
correction and more reliably protecting the institutional integrity
and decisional autonomy of the Article III courts.
CONCLUSION: SEPARATION OF POWERS THEORY AND DOCTRINE
MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE STRUCTURAL FACT THAT THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH IS ALSO THE WEAKEST BRANCH
Alexander Hamilton was correct to posit that the federal judiciary
is the weakest of the three branches of the federal government.464
Unfortunately, however, the contemporary Supreme Court has
failed to take this important structural fact adequately into account
when developing and applying the separation of powers doctrine in
instances when Congress attempts to snatch or reassign judicial
power from the Article III courts. If the Justices do not defend their
turf with greater alacrity going forward, they may well be surprised
to find how little of it they have retained.
The inherent structural weakness of the judiciary vis-à-vis the
legislative and executive branches of the federal government makes
it necessary to more strictly enforce separation of powers principles
to safeguard the judiciary’s capacity to “say what the law is.”465
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s recent functionalist decisions are
deeply misguided and should be overruled. Pragmatic formalist
enforcement of the separation of powers doctrine in cases involving
congressional case snatching need not unduly constrain Congress’s
power to exercise its legislative authority in ways that seriously
affect pending litigation.466 Given that this is so, the contemporary
463. EURIPIDES, supra note 74 (“A bad end comes from a bad beginning.”).
464. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 465-66.
465. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”).
466. See supra notes 427-48 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court’s reticence to protect the institutional authority and
constitutional powers of the Article III courts is quite puzzling.
The Supreme Court failed to vindicate the Madisonian system of
separated powers in both Patchak and Bank Markazi. It also failed
to flag a serious structural problem, from a separation of powers
perspective, with the USPTO’s inter partes review process.467 The
federal courts must do better going forward if the Madisonian
system of checks and balances is to function as the Framers
intended for it to work—and thereby safeguard individual liberty.468
If the Supreme Court fails to defend the federal courts from
congressional efforts to reassign, or snatch, duties that the Constitu-
tion vests with the judiciary, the federal courts are very likely to see
more examples of such congressional power grabs—and these
enactments will undoubtedly affect an ever-growing swath of
judicial business. The surest and most reliable way to safeguard the
institutional independence, autonomy, and dignity of the Article III
courts would be to categorically and resolutely reject any and all
forms of congressional case snatching.
467. See Oil States Energy Servs. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp. LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365
(2018).
468. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1515-17 (1991).
